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Introduction 
Every day, we make many decisions that are based on previous experiences and 
existing knowledge. This happens almost automatically as we rely on a number of 
heuristics (i.e., mental shortcuts) that ease reasoning processes (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974). Heuristic reasoning is typically useful, especially in routine situations. But it can 
also produce systematic errors (i.e., biases; this concept will be discussed in more detail 
later). Let us consider the following example: 
 
If someone conducts scientific research, s/he works at a university. 
Lara worked at the Erasmus University Rotterdam. 
Therefore, Lara conducted scientific research. 
 
Because of its believability, most people will intuitively judge the conclusion as valid (cf. 
belief bias: Evans et al., 1983; Markovits & Nantel, 1989; Newstead et al., 1992), but the 
if-then rule does not state that someone working at a university conducts scientific 
research. We do know that Lara worked at a university, but we cannot deduce whether 
she conducted scientific research. Lara might have performed research procedures 
without scientific purposes, for instance, or she might have performed educational 
activities or support services. The conclusion would not necessarily follow from the 
premises and is, therefore, invalid. This syllogistic reasoning task requires replacement 
of the heuristic response with a response based on formal logic. Although in this 
example, the negative consequences are limited, heuristic reasoning can also produce 
biases with far-reaching consequences. To illustrate, a forensic expert who misjudges 
fingerprint evidence because it verifies his or her preexisting beliefs concerning the 
likelihood of the guilt of a defendant, displays the so-called confirmation bias, which can 
result in a misidentification and a wrongful conviction (e.g., the Madrid bomber case; 
Kassin et al., 2013). Fortunately, we are not doomed to reach wrong conclusions and to 
make incorrect decisions as in this example. Our primary tool for making better decisions 
is critical thinking (henceforth, in this dissertation, abbreviated as CT).  
 
The importance of CT was already stressed by Socrates over 2,500 years ago and 
received renewed interest in the beginning of the 20th century. In 1910, John Dewey 
described the importance of critique and stated that everyone should engage in CT. Due 
to the expanding and changing demands that today’s society places on people, the 
importance of being able to think critically has only increased (Pellegrino & Hilton, 2012). 
Because CT is essential for succeeding in future careers and to be efficacious citizens, 
helping students to become critically-thinking professionals is a central aim of higher 
education (Butler & Halpern, 2020; Davies, 2013; DeAngelo et al., 2009; Elen et al., 2019; 
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Facione, 1990; Halpern, 2014; Halpern & Butler, 2019; Van Gelder, 2005; Verburgh, 
2013). 
 
Consequently, many international (Ananiadou & Claro, 2009; OECD, 2018; Vincent-
Lancrin et al., 2019) and national (i.e., Dutch: HBO-raad, 2009; OCW, 2019; 
Onderwijsraad, 2014a, 2014b, 2017, 2018; Vereniging Hogescholen, 2015) higher 
education policy documents include objectives to enhance students’ CT-skills. To 
illustrate, around the start of this project, Avans Hogeschool, a Dutch University of 
Applied Sciences1, had set explicit CT-aims in the documents detailing the educational 
ambitions (Avans Hogeschool, 2014a, 2014b) such as “every graduate is curious, shows 
a critical attitude, and is analytical. Therefore, we are committed to developing student’s 
reflective and critical thinking capacity" (Avans Hogeschool, 2014b, p. 5)2. Several large-
scale longitudinal studies, however, were quite pessimistic that this laudable goal would 
be realized merely by following a higher education degree program. These studies 
revealed that far too many higher education graduates lack the knowledge, beliefs, skills, 
and strategies required to think critically after four years of college (Arum & Roksa, 2011; 
Flores et al., 2012; Pascarella et al., 2011; although a more recent meta-analytic study 
reached the more positive conclusion that students’ do improve their CT-skills over 
college years: Huber & Kuncel, 2016). 
 
Hence, there is a growing body of literature on effective strategies for teaching CT in 
general (e.g., Abrami et al., 2008, 2014; Angeli & Valanides, 2009; Niu et al., 2013; 
Tiruneh et al., 2014, 2016) and avoiding reasoning biases in particular (Heijltjes et al., 
2014a, 2014b, 2015; Van Brussel et al., 2020). It is well established, for instance, that 
bringing about learning of CT-skills is conditional upon provision of explicit CT-
instructions and practice problems (e.g., Abrami et al., 2008, Heijltjes et al., 2014b). Yet 
there are still many open questions about optimal instructional designs to further 
enhance CT, and especially to establish transfer of CT-skills. Transfer refers to the ability 
to apply acquired knowledge and skills to novel situations (e.g., Barnett & Ceci, 2002; 
Perkins & Salomon, 1992). It is crucial that students think critically, especially in situations 
that have not been encountered before and where biases can have serious 
consequences (e.g., in complex professional environments in which the majority of 
higher education graduates are employed, such as medicine: Elia et al., 2016; Mamede 
et al., 2010; Law: Kassin et al., 2013; Koehler et al., 2002; Rachlinski, 2004). Therefore, 
the overall aim of this dissertation was to acquire more knowledge on effective strategies 
for fostering both learning and transfer of CT-skills in higher education, focusing 
specifically on avoiding bias in reasoning and drawing from findings from educational 
                                               
1 The Dutch education system distinguishes between research-oriented higher education (i.e., offered by research 
universities) and profession-oriented higher education (i.e., offered by universities of applied sciences). 
2 Surprisingly, CT is not (yet) explicitly mentioned in the latest ambition plan of Avans Hogeschool (2019). 
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and cognitive psychology. A brief overview of the history and theories of CT and biased 
reasoning and current research on teaching CT will serve as a preamble. 
What is critical thinking? 
CT finds its basis in the thoughts of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and other Greek 
philosophers. The term itself originated from this ancient Greek tradition as well; the word 
critical derives from the Greek words ‘kritikos’ (i.e., to judge/discern) and ‘kriterion’ (i.e., 
standards). Etymologically, then, CT implies making judgments based on standards. 
Hundreds of thinkers from different disciplines have subsequently made contributions to 
the idea of critical thought. John Dewey is considered the progenitor of the modern CT 
tradition. He described reflective thinking – his homologue to CT – to include “active, 
persistent, and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the 
light of the grounds that support it, and the further conclusion to which it tends” (1910, 
p. 7). A variety of definitions has been suggested since then. Edward Glaser (1941), for 
example, expanded Dewey’s definition to recognize the role of having certain thinking 
skills, but also of being disposed to use these skills. He was the first to describe CT as 
a composite of attitudes, knowledge, and skills. Robert Ennis (1962) took Dewey's 
definition and transformed it into a more general simplified definition that could provide 
a basis for research. According to him, CT implies “reasonable reflective thinking 
focused on deciding what to believe or do”. The most accepted definition in the field of 
educational assessment and instruction, however, has been proposed by an expert 
Delphi Panel of the American Philosophical Association (APA). They agreed to 
characterize CT as: 
 
“purposeful, self-regulatory judgment that results in interpretation, analysis, 
evaluation, and inference, as well as explanations of the considerations on 
which that judgment is based… The ideal critical thinker is habitually 
inquisitive, well-informed, trustful of reason, open-minded, flexible, fair-
mined in evaluation, honest in facing personal biases, prudent in making 
judgments, willing to reconsider, clear about issues, orderly in complex 
matters, diligent in seeking relevant information, reasonable in the selection 
of criteria, focused in inquiry, and persistent in seeking results which are as 
precise as the subject and the circumstances of inquiry permit.” (Facione, 
1990, p. 2). 
 
Despite the variety of definitions of CT and the multitude of components, there appears 
to be agreement that one key aspect of CT is the ability to avoid bias in reasoning and 
decision-making (Baron, 2008; Duron et al., 2006; West et al., 2008), which we will refer 
to as unbiased reasoning from hereon. This is the aspect of CT on which the research 
Chapter 1 
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presented in this dissertation is focused. Bias is said to occur when a reasoning process 
results in a systematic deviation from ideal normative standards derived from laws of 
logic and probability (Stanovich et al., 2016; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Up to now, a 
substantial amount of literature has focused on the variety of heuristics and biases that 
exists. The so-called ‘heuristics and biases’ approach has generated influential research 
on CT and is central to this dissertation. 
Heuristics and biases 
The basic idea of the heuristics and biases approach, launched by Daniel Kahneman 
and Amos Tversky in the early 1970s, is that people rely on a variety of simple heuristics 
for judgment under uncertainty (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972, 1973; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). As alluded to earlier, people resort to heuristics because these can 
help solve many different problems and make quick decisions, especially with rules and 
principles that have been practiced to automaticity (i.e., routine circumstances; 
Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Kahneman & Klein, 2009; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; 
Stanovich, 2011). Heuristic reasoning allows us to not spend endless amounts of time 
and effort analyzing every information around us and is, therefore, very functional. For 
instance, when a medical emergency calls for action, an experienced clinician can use 
a recognizable pattern of cues to quickly make a diagnosis or size up a situation. 
However, the use of heuristics can also give rise to biases in reasoning and decision-
making, as illustrated at the beginning of this chapter. 
 
Kahneman and Tversky originally classified biases as associated with three such 
general-purpose heuristics (note that this is not the only classification of heuristics, 
however): representativeness, availability, and anchoring and adjustment (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). The representativeness heuristic is characterized by the fact that 
people often evaluate the probability of an uncertain event by similarity with other events 
of the same type and causal/correlational beliefs (Chapman & Chapman, 1967; Jennings 
et al., 1982; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). Specifically, representativeness concerns the 
degree of correspondence between an outcome and a model. To illustrate, Tversky and 
Kahneman (1983) asked undergraduates questions as “is it more probable that 
someone (selected by chance) has had a heart attack or that someone has had a heart 
attack and is over 55 years old?” Due to the natural assessment of a strong relation 
between heart failure and older age, thus high representativeness, the majority of 
graduates incorrectly perceived the conjunction of a heart attack and the age of 55 as 
more likely than a heart attack alone. Here, the use of the representativeness heuristic 
leads to neglect of conjunction rule (P(A&B)  P(B)), known as the conjunction fallacy. 
 
In case of the availability heuristic, people evaluate the probability of an event according 
to the ease with which examples come to mind (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 1983). 
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Events that are easy to retrieve from memory are regarded to be much more frequent 
and probable than they actually are. This can be the result of high exposure, as is the 
case, for instance, with terrorist attacks, airplane crashes, or natural disasters. But it can 
also be due to personal experiences/encounters. For example, if you are asked if it is 
more likely that the letter K appears in the first or third position of a word in English, you 
might estimate the first position as more probable. Just because it is much easier to 
recall words with the letter K in the first rather than the third position, however, the latter 
is actually more probable. In this case, the use of the heuristic results in availability bias 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). 
 
When people focus on an initial number or value (anchor) and then render a final 
estimate towards the anchor, they resort to the anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic 
(Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1971; Slovic, 1967; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). For instance, 
when people were asked whether they would pay $25 (low anchor) or $200 (high anchor) 
to clean up lakes to protect fish populations and were then asked to estimate the amount 
the average person would contribute, they gave mean estimates of $14 and $36 with the 
low and high anchors, respectively. Here, the use of the heuristic leads to anchoring bias 
(Kahneman & Knetsch, 1993, Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
Origins of biases 
The occurrence of biases in thinking and reasoning can be explained by dual process 
models, which hold that there are two distinct cognitive systems that underlie thinking, 
reasoning, and decision-making: Type 1 and Type 2 processing, also referred to by 
some as System 1 and System 2 (Evans, 2003, 2008; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; 
Stanovich, 1999, 2005, 2011). Type 1 processing is heuristic-based and operates 
automatically, autonomously, and rapidly, by means of parallel processing. As such, 
Type 1 processing is relatively effortless and does not place heavy demands on working 
memory. It has been shown that Type 1 processing is especially useful and functional 
during routine circumstances. Even a complex, but standard task can be completed with 
Type 1 processing (e.g., reading; or, for most Dutch people, cycling). However, in other 
(non-routine) situations, Type 1 processing might produce biased outcomes (Evans, 
2003, 2008). Consider for example a clinician who has read information on a disease in 
the morning and later that day misdiagnoses a case of a patient who is presented with 
similar features (which triggered that diagnosis read earlier) but had in fact a different 
disease. That clinician makes use of the rapid and automatic Type 1 processes (i.e., 
availability heuristic, leading to availability bias; Schmidt et al., 2014). Thus, although the 
use of the availability heuristic may lead to efficient (i.e., fast and sound) decision-making 
in routine situations, it may also open the door to biases that could have been prevented 
by analytical and reflective reasoning, which is labelled as Type 2 processing. 
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Type 2 processing involves controlled processes that are relatively slow and largely 
sequential. One of the most crucial functions of Type 2 processing is to override Type 1 
processing when this is to our benefit. To override Type 1 processing, one has to 
recognize the need for Type 2 processing and has to try to switch to this type of 
processing. This is only possible, however, when Type 1 processing can successfully 
be inhibited. Furthermore, this will only lead to a more favorable outcome when relevant 
mindware – consisting of both relevant procedural and conceptual knowledge – is 
available to provide better alternative responses (Aczel et al., 2015; Aron, 2008; Best et 
al., 2009; Stanovich, 2011; Zelazo, 2004). Biases occur when people use Type 1 
processing when that is not appropriate, do not recognize the need for Type 2 
processing, are not willing to switch to Type 2 processing or unable to sustain it (e.g., 
due to lack of sufficient cognitive capacity or time pressure), or miss the relevant 
mindware to come up with a better response. Consequently, in order to prevent biased 
reasoning, it is, first of all, necessary to stimulate people to switch to Type 2 processing. 
However, that may not be enough if they lack the necessary mindware, so in many cases, 
mindware has to be taught as well. In the next section, I will review what research has 
revealed with respect to effective ways of teaching CT in general, and then zoom in on 
effective methods for teaching students to avoid bias in reasoning. 
Current research on teaching critical thinking 
Previous research has established that CT-skills in general rarely evolve as a by-product 
of education; rather, they need to be explicitly taught (Abrami et al., 2008, 2014; Arum & 
Roksa, 2011; Beyer, 2008). However, there are different views of what the best way is to 
teach CT; the most well-known debate being whether CT should be taught in a general 
or content-specific manner (Abrami et al., 2014; Davies, 2013; Ennis, 1989; Moore, 
2004). On the one hand, generalists (e.g., Ennis, 1989, 1992) ague that CT is a universal, 
general skill that can be applied to many contents and, as such, might be best learned 
separately from regular subject matter adjunct to the standard curriculum (Royalty, 1995; 
Stanovich & West, 1999). According to specifists (e.g., McPeck, 1990, 1992) on the other 
hand, CT cannot be separated from the subject matter to which it is applied and, 
therefore, should be taught in specific academic disciplines (Tsui, 2002). During the last 
years, this debate has faded away, since most researchers nowadays commonly agree 
that CT can be seen in terms of both general skills (e.g., sound argumentation, evaluating 
statistical information, and so on) and specific skills or knowledge used in the context of 
disciplines (e.g., Davies, 2013; Ikuenobe, 2001; Robinson, 2011; Smith, 2002; Tsui, 
2002). 
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Indeed, it has been shown that the most effective teaching methods combine generic 
instruction, in which general CT-skills and dispositions are taught separately from 
subject matter, with the opportunity to integrate the general principles that were taught 
with domain-specific subject matter through infusion or immersion (i.e., mixed courses; 
for meta-analyses, see Abrami et al., 2008, 2014). In infusion methods, general CT 
principles are made explicit and students are encouraged to deal with specific subject 
matter in a critical way, while immersion methods invite students to reflect and make 
judgments on specific disciplinary issues without general CT principles made explicit 
(Ennis, 1989). Merely providing students with generic, infusion, or immersion courses, 
respectively, seemed less effective for fostering CT than mixed courses (Abrami et al., 
2008, 2014). In the same vein, Tiruneh and colleagues (2014), found that both generic 
and mixed courses resulted in better CT outcomes than infusion and immersion courses.  
Teaching for unbiased reasoning 
A considerable number of studies on avoiding bias in reasoning has focused on 
strategies to mitigate specific biases (referred to as debiasing strategies; e.g., Aczel et 
al., 2015a; Catapano et al, 2019; Herzog & Hertwig, 2009; Kaufmann et al., 2010; Larrick, 
2004; Lord et al., 1984). These studies, however, are not concerned with the 
implementation of these strategies in education. Some studies that did address teaching 
unbiased reasoning reflect the finding of studies concerned with teaching general CT-
skills (Abrami et al., 2008, 2014): combining explicit CT-instruction with the opportunity 
to apply the principles that were taught on domain-relevant problems seems beneficial 
for learning of unbiased reasoning (Heijltjes et al., 2014a, 2014b, 2015). In these studies, 
students participated in a pretest-intervention-posttest design. The intervention 
consisted of either explicit, implicit, or no CT-instructions that were offered either with or 
without opportunity to practice in a domain context. Unbiased reasoning was 
operationalized as performance on classical heuristics-and-biases tasks (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974), in which an intuitively cued heuristic response conflicts normative 
models of CT as set by formal logic and probability theory. 
 
Although these studies uncovered that a combination of explicit CT-instructions and task 
practice promotes learning of unbiased reasoning, they also consistently observed that 
this was not sufficient to establish transfer to novel problem types (and this also applies 
to CT-skills more generally, see for example, Halpern, 2014; Kenyon & Beaulac, 2014; 
Lai, 2011; Ritchhart & Perkins, 2005; Tiruneh et al., 2016). The process of transfer 
involves the application of acquired knowledge or skills to some new context or related 
materials (e.g., Barnett & Ceci, 2002; Cormier & Hagman, 2014; Druckman & Bjork, 1994; 
Haskell, 2001; McDaniel, 2007; Perkins & Salomon, 1992). In the educational psychology 
literature, transfer has been described as existing on a continuum from near to far, with 
lower degrees of similarity between the initial and transfer situation along the way (e.g., 
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Perkins & Salomon, 1992). This lack of transfer is worrisome because it would be 
unfeasible to train students on each and every type of reasoning bias they will ever 
encounter (and this also applies to CT-skills more generally, see for example, Halpern, 
2014; Kenyon & Beaulac, 2014; Lai, 2011; Ritchhart & Perkins, 2005). Surprisingly, 
though, it has not yet been investigated what kind of practice activities can promote (far) 
transfer. 
 
The existing transfer literature suggests that, to establish transfer, instructional strategies 
should contribute to actively constructing meaning from to-be-learned information, by 
mentally organizing it in coherent knowledge structures and integrate these principles 
with one’s prior knowledge (i.e., generative processing; Grabowski, 1996; Osborne & 
Wittrock, 1983; Wittrock, 1974, 1990, 1992, 2010). Generative processing can help 
learners acquire abstractions of the underlying principles behind a problem that are 
required for transfer of learned skills. If the potential transfer situation presents similar 
requirements and the learner recognizes them, they may select and apply the same or 
a somewhat adapted learned procedure to solve the novel problem (e.g., Gentner, 1983, 
1989; Mayer & Wittrock, 1996; Reed, 1987; Vosniadou & Ortony, 1989). Indeed, 
strategies that encourage generative processing have been shown to foster knowledge 
acquisition and promote transfer of various other cognitive skills (e.g., Fiorella & Mayer, 
2015, 2016). Ways to stimulate generative processing are, for instance, encouraging 
elaboration, questioning, or explanation during practice (e.g., Fiorella & Mayer, 2016; 
Renkl & Eitel, 2019), creating variability in practice (e.g., Barreiros et al., 2007; Moxley, 
1979), stimulating comparison of correct problem solutions with erroneous ones (e.g., 
Durkin & Rittle-johnson, 2012; Loibl & Leuders, 2018, 2019), or having students 
repeatedly retrieve to-be-learned material from memory (Butler, 2010; Carpenter & Kelly, 
2012; McDaniel et al., 2012, 2013; Rohrer et al., 2010). 
 
Taken together, despite the value placed on teaching CT, it remains a disputed point 
how to do this more effectively. It has been established that bringing about learning of 
CT-skills is conditional upon provision of explicit CT-instructions and practice problems, 
but there are still many open questions about optimal practice activities to further 
enhance CT, in ways that transfer across tasks/contexts. To properly inform educational 
practice about optimally tailoring CT courses, further study is therefore required. The 
studies presented in this dissertation overall aim to gain more knowledge on fostering 
higher education students’ learning and transfer of CT-skills – through instructional 
interventions that target generative processing – focusing specifically on avoiding bias 
in reasoning. This leads to the main research questions, which will be discussed in the 
next section. 
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Context and overview of this dissertation 
This dissertation is one of the results of the broader NWO-funded research project 
“Investing in Thinking Pays Good Interest: Improving Critical Thinking Skills of Students 
and Teachers in Higher Professional Education”. In this project, a consortium of 
researchers from Erasmus University Rotterdam and Utrecht University and educational 
policy advisors, teachers, and researchers from Avans University of Applied Sciences, 
aimed to generate knowledge on teaching CT that would be scientifically relevant as well 
as directly relevant for educational practice. The main objective of this project was to 
improve higher education students’ CT-skills, by investigating how to equip teachers 
with the knowledge and skills needed to effectively teach unbiased reasoning 
(conducted by Eva Janssen, Utrecht University) and how to further enhance students’ 
skills to avoid bias in reasoning, in such a way that these would also transfer across 
tasks/contexts. 
 
The studies in Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5 are concerned with the main question of whether 
instructional interventions that are known to foster generative processing and transfer of 
other cognitive skills, would further facilitate learning and transfer of CT-skills required 
for unbiased reasoning (i.e., above and beyond effects of instruction and practice). 
These interventions were administered after initial instruction, during the practice phase. 
In addition, the study in Chapter 6, experimentally examined what obstacle(s) prevent(s) 
successful transfer of these CT-skills. An important aspect of this dissertation is that all 
studies contained or consisted of an experiment conducted in a real educational setting 
and as part of an existing course (using educationally relevant materials) at a University 
of Applied Sciences, which increases ecological validity of the studies. 
 
The classroom study presented in Chapter 2 addressed the question of whether 
prompting students to self-explain during practice; that is, to generate explanations of a 
problem-solution to themselves (e.g., Bisra et al., 2018; Chi, 2000; Fiorella & Mayer, 
2016) would be effective for fostering (transfer of) unbiased reasoning. Students were 
provided with instruction on the importance and features of CT, on the skills and attitudes 
needed to think critically, and on several heuristics-and-biases tasks. Subsequently, they 
performed practice activities on domain-relevant problems in the task categories they 
were given instructions on, either with or without self-explanation prompts. Students’ 
performance on heuristics-and-biases tasks (both on instructed/practiced tasks, to 
assess learning, and on novel tasks that shared underling principles, to assess transfer), 
perceived mental effort investment, and time-on-test were measured on a pretest, 
immediate posttest, and two-week delayed posttest. Additionally, it was explored 
whether the quality of students’ self-explanations was related to their performance. 
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In Chapter 3, two experiments (laboratory and classroom) tested whether creating 
variability during practice through interleaved practice (in which practice task categories 
vary from trial to trial, as opposed to blocked practice; e.g., Barreiros et al., 2007; 
Helsdingen et al., 2011; Rau et al., 2013) would be effective for fostering unbiased 
reasoning. While interleaved practice has been shown to enhance learning (e.g., 
Helsdingen et al., 2011a, 2011b) it is usually more cognitively demanding than blocked 
practice, and very high cognitive load may hinder learning (Paas et al., 2003a). 
Therefore, it was additionally examined whether learners would experience lower 
cognitive load and benefit more from interleaved practice, when using worked examples 
as opposed to practice problems (cf. Paas & Van Merriënboer, 1994). Worked examples 
have been shown to reduce ineffective cognitive load (compared to practice problems; 
Van Gog et al., 2019). After receiving explicit instruction on CT and specific heuristics-
and-biases tasks, students either practiced in an interleaved schedule with worked 
examples, an interleaved schedule with problems, a blocked schedule with worked 
examples, or a blocked schedule with problems. Again, students’ performance on 
several heuristics-and-biases tasks (both on instructed/practiced tasks and novel tasks), 
perceived mental effort investment, and time-on-test were measured on a pretest, 
immediate posttest, and two-week delayed posttest. Additionally, students’ global 
judgements of learning and experienced cognitive load during practice were explored. 
 
The classroom study reported in Chapter 4 investigated whether comparing correct and 
erroneous examples (i.e., contrasting examples) would enhance unbiased reasoning 
more than studying correct examples only, studying erroneous examples only, and 
solving practice problems. Students were provided with the CT-instructions and practice 
on domain-relevant problems, under one of the four conditions. Their performance on 
heuristics-and-biases tasks (both on instructed/practiced tasks and novel tasks), mental 
effort investment, and time-on-test were measured on a pretest, immediate posttest, 
three-week delayed posttest, and nine-month delayed posttest. Furthermore, effects on 
perceived mental effort and time-on-task during practice were explored. 
 
In Chapter 5, a classroom study is described that empirically investigated whether 
repeated retrieval practice over time (i.e., working on practice tasks in sessions that were 
weeks apart), would be beneficial for learning to reason in an unbiased manner and 
whether it can additionally facilitate transfer. Students were instructed on CT and 
avoiding belief-bias in syllogistic reasoning and practiced with syllogisms on domain-
relevant problems, followed by feedback on their performance. Depending on assigned 
condition, they did not engage in extra practice, practiced a second time (week later), 
or practiced a second (week later) and third time (two weeks after second time). 
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Students’ performance on heuristics-and-biases tasks (both on instructed/practiced 
syllogisms and novel tasks that shared similar features with syllogisms), mental effort 
investment, and time-on-test were measured on a pretest and immediate posttest. 
Additionally, explorative data on students’ global judgements of learning, perceived 
mental effort during practice, time-on-task during practice, and time spent on worked-
example feedback after correct and incorrect retrievals were collected. 
 
Understanding the nuances of transfer is necessary to design courses to achieve it. So, 
it is crucial to gain insight into the obstacles to transfer of CT. Therefore, the study in 
Chapter 6 focused exclusively on identifying whether unsuccessful transfer of CT-skills 
would be due to a failure to recognize that acquired knowledge is relevant in a new 
context, to recall that knowledge, or to apply that knowledge to the new context (i.e., the 
three-step model of transfer; Barnett & Ceci, 2012). In two experiments (classroom and 
laboratory), students received explicit instructions on CT and avoiding belief-bias in 
syllogistic reasoning and practiced with syllogisms on domain-relevant problems. 
Students’ performance on heuristics-and-biases tasks (on syllogisms with different story 
contexts to assess learning, syllogisms in a different format to assess near transfer, and 
novel tasks that shared similar features with syllogisms to assess transfer) and time-on-
test were measured on a pretest and immediate posttest. On the posttest transfer items, 
students received no support, received recognition support, were prompted to recall the 
acquired knowledge, or received recall support (cf. Butler et al., 2013, 2017). The effects 
of support for different steps in the process were compared to infer where difficulties 
arise for learners. Additionally, it was explored (within the free recall condition) whether 
students’ ability to recall the acquired knowledge was related to their posttest 
performance on near and transfer items. 
 
Finally, Chapter 7 provides a summary and discussion of the main findings of Chapters 
2 to 6. In addition, this chapter discusses the implications for future research on CT and 
for educational practice.
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Chapter 2 
 
Abstract 
Critical thinking is considered to be an important competence for 
students and graduates of higher education. Yet, it is largely unclear 
which teaching methods are most effective in supporting the 
acquisition of critical thinking skills, especially regarding one 
important aspect of critical thinking: avoiding biased reasoning. The 
present study examined whether creating desirable difficulties in 
instruction by prompting students to generate explanations of a 
problem-solution to themselves (i.e. self-explaining) is effective for 
fostering learning and transfer of unbiased reasoning. Seventy-nine 
first-year students of a Dutch Applied University of Sciences were 
first instructed on two categories of ‘heuristics-and-biases’ tasks 
(syllogism and base-rate or Wason and conjunction). Thereafter, they 
practiced these either with (self-explaining condition) or without (no 
self-explaining condition) self-explanation prompts that asked them 
to motivate their answers. Performance was measured on a pretest, 
immediate posttest, and delayed (two weeks later) posttest on all four 
task categories, to examine effects on learning (performance on 
practiced tasks) and transfer (performance on non-practiced tasks). 
Participants’ learning and transfer performance improved to a 
comparable degree from pretest to immediate posttest in both 
conditions, and this higher level of performance was retained on the 
delayed posttest. Surprisingly, self-explanation prompts had a 
negative effect on posttest performance on practiced tasks when 
those were Wason and conjunction tasks, and self-explaining had no 
effect on transfer performance. These findings suggest that the 
benefits of explicit instruction and practice on learning and transfer 
of unbiased reasoning cannot be enhanced by increasing the 
difficulty of the practice tasks through self-explaining. 
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Introduction 
Fostering students’ critical thinking (CT) skills is an important educational objective, as 
these skills are essential for effective communication, reasoning and problem-solving 
abilities, and participation in a democratic society (Billings & Roberts, 2014). Therefore, 
it is alarming that many higher education students find it hard to think critically; their level 
of CT is often too low (Flores et al., 2012) and CT-skills do not seem to improve over their 
college years (e.g., Arum & Roksa, 2011). As early as 1910, John Dewey described the 
importance of critique and stated that everyone needs to engage in CT. A variety of CT 
definitions has been suggested since then, the most accepted definition in the field of 
educational assessment and instruction of which has been proposed by an expert 
Delphi Panel of the American Philosophical Association (APA; Facione, 1990). They 
characterized CT as “purposeful, self-regulatory judgment that results in interpretation, 
analysis, evaluation, and inference, as well as explanation of the evidential, conceptual, 
methodological, criteriological, or contextual considerations on which that judgment is 
based” (Facione, 1990, p.2). Despite the variety of definitions of CT and the multitude of 
components, there appears to be agreement that one key aspect of CT is the ability to 
avoid biases in reasoning and decision-making (West et al., 2008), which we will refer to 
as unbiased reasoning from hereon. Bias is said to occur when a reasoning process 
results in a systematic deviation from a norm when choosing actions or estimating 
probabilities (Stanovich et al., 2016; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). As biased reasoning 
can have serious consequences in situations in both daily life and the complex 
professional environments (e.g., economics, law, and medicine) in which the majority of 
higher education graduates end up working, it is essential to teach unbiased reasoning 
in higher education (e.g., Koehler et al., 2002; Rachlinski, 2004). However, it is still largely 
unclear how unbiased reasoning can be best taught, and especially how transfer can 
be fostered; that is, the ability to apply acquired knowledge and skills to new situations 
(e.g., Davies, 2013). 
 
In line with findings of research on teaching CT in general (e.g., Abrami et al., 2014), 
previous research on unbiased reasoning has shown that providing students with explicit 
instructions and giving them the opportunity to practice what has been learned, 
improves performance on the learned tasks, but not transfer (e.g., Heijltjes et al., 2014b). 
This lack of transfer is a problem, as it is important that students can apply what has 
been learned to other situations. According to the desirable difficulties framework (e.g., 
Bjork, 1994; Bjork & Bjork, 2011; Fyfe & Rittle-Johnson, 2017; Soderstrom & Bjork, 2015), 
long-term performance and transfer can be enhanced by techniques that are effortful 
during learning and may seem to temporarily hold back performance gains. Conditions 
that support rapid improvement of performance (i.e. retrieval strength) often only support 
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momentary performance gains and do not contribute to permanent changes needed for 
learning (Bjork & Bjork, 2011). To enhance long-term retention and transfer of learned 
skills, storage strength should be increased by effortful learning conditions that trigger 
deep processing (Yan et al., 2016). The active and deeper processing produced by 
encountering desirable difficulties can promote transfer to new situations (cf. germane 
load; Soderstrom & Bjork, 2015). If, however, the difficulties evoke learners to invest 
additional effort on processes that are not directly relevant for learning or the learners 
miss the relevant knowledge or skills to successfully deal with them, they become 
undesirable (McDaniel & Butler, 2010; Metcalfe, 2011). 
 
Although conditions inducing the most immediate and observable signs of performance 
improvements are often preferred by both teachers and learners because they appear 
to be effective, it is important for teachers and students alike to search for conditions 
that confront students with desirable difficulties and thereby facilitate learning and 
transfer (Bjork et al., 2015). Such conditions include, for example, spacing learning 
sessions apart rather than massing them together (i.e., spacing effect), mixing practice-
task categories rather than practicing one task category before the next (i.e., interleaving 
effect), and testing learning material rather than simply restudying it (i.e., testing effect; 
e.g., Weissgerber et al., 2018). Another desirable difficulty is the active generation of an 
answer, solution, or procedure rather than the mere passive reception of it (i.e., 
generation effect; for a review see Bertsch et al., 2007). Generative processing of 
learning materials requires learners to invest additional effort on the learning processes 
and to be actively involved in these processes, such as encoding and retrieval 
processes (Yan et al., 2016). Therefore, generative learning activities contribute to the 
connection and entrenchment of new information from the to-be-learned materials to 
existing knowledge. As a result, understanding of the materials is stimulated and is more 
likely to be recallable at a later time or in a different context (Bjork & Bjork, 2011; 
DeWinstanley & Bjork, 2004; Fiorella & Mayer, 2016; Slamecka & Graf, 1978). 
 
One promising strategy to promote generative learning, and thus to create desirable 
difficulty in instruction, is self-explaining (e.g., Fiorella & Mayer, 2016). Self-explaining 
involves the generation of explanations of a problem-solution to oneself rather than 
simply answering tasks passively. Indeed, self-explaining has been shown to foster 
knowledge acquisition and to promote transfer in a variety of other domains (e.g., 
Dunlosky et al., 2013; Fiorella & Mayer, 2016; Lombrozo, 2006; Rittle-Johnson & Loehr, 
2017; Wylie & Chi, 2014; for a review see Bisra et al., 2018), but the effectivity in CT-
instruction is not yet clear. Self-explaining is assumed to lead to the construction of 
meaningful knowledge structures (i.e., mindware), by investing effort in identifying 
knowledge gaps or faulty mental models and connecting new information to prior 
knowledge (e.g., Atkinson et al., 2003; Chi, 2000; Fiorella & Mayer, 2016), and seems 
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especially effective in domains guided by general underlying principles (Rittle-Johnson 
& Loehr, 2017). Moreover, self-explaining might stimulate students to stop and think 
about new problem-solving strategies (Siegler, 2002) with engagement in more 
analytical and reflective reasoning, labeled as Type 2 processing, as a result. This type 
of processing is required to avoid biases in reasoning and decision-making. Biases often 
result from relying on Type 1 processing to solve problems, which is a relatively 
effortless, automatic, and intuitive type of processing. Although Type 1 processing may 
lead to efficient decision-making in many routine situations, it may open the door to errors 
that could have been prevented by engaging in Type 2 processing (e.g., Evans, 2008; 
Stanovich, 2011). As such, self-explaining might contribute to decoupling prior beliefs 
from available evidence, which is an essential aspect of unbiased reasoning. It is 
important to bear in mind, however, that the benefit of self-explaining only applies when 
students are able to provide self-explanations of sufficient quality (Schworm & Renkl, 
2007).  
 
Several studies demonstrated that prompting self-explaining fostered learning and/or 
transfer of certain aspects of CT-skills, such as argumentation (e.g., Schworm & Renkl, 
2007), complex judgments (e.g., Helsdingen et al., 2011b), or logical reasoning (e.g., 
Berry, 1983). Studies on the effect of self-explanation prompts on unbiased reasoning 
(Heijltjes et al., 2014a, 2014b, 2015), however, showed mixed findings. One study found 
an effect on transfer performance on an immediate posttest (Heijltjes et al., 2014a), but 
this effect was short-lived (i.e., not retained on a delayed posttest) and not replicated in 
other studies (Heijltjes et al., 2014b; Heijltjes et al., 2015). This lack of (prolonged) effects 
of self-explaining might have been due to the nature of the final tests, which were 
multiple-choice (MC) answers only. A study in which students had to motivate their MC-
answers suggests that this might provide a better, more sensitive measure of the effects 
of self-explaining on transfer of unbiased reasoning (Hoogerheide et al., 2014). 
Therefore, the present study used MC-plus-motivation tests to investigate whether self-
explaining is effective for fostering learning and transfer of unbiased reasoning. 
 
Since it seems reasonable to assume, but is as yet unproven, that increasing the 
desirable difficulty of learning materials through self-explaining might foster learning and 
transfer of unbiased reasoning, the present study was conducted as part of an existing 
critical thinking course (i.e., classroom study) to examine the usefulness of this desirable 
difficulty in a real educational setting. We investigated the effects of self-explaining 
during practice with ‘heuristics-and-biases tasks’ (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) on 
learning and transfer, as assessed by final test tasks which required students to motivate 
their MC-answers. Based on the literature reviewed above, we hypothesized that explicit 
CT-instructions combined with practice on domain-specific cases would be effective for 
learning: therefore, we expected performance gains on practiced tasks from pretest to 
Chapter 2 
 26 
posttest as measured by MC-answers (Hypothesis 1). The more interesting question, 
however, is whether self-explaining during practice would lead to higher performance 
gains on practiced (i.e., learning; Hypothesis 2a) and non-practiced tasks (i.e., transfer; 
Hypothesis 2b) than not being prompted to self-explain during practice. As outlined 
before, we expected that beneficial effects of self-explaining on performance outcomes 
are more likely to be detected when participants are required to motivate their answer to 
MC-items. We hypothesized that self-explaining during practice would lead to higher 
total posttest scores (i.e., MC-plus-motivation) on practiced (i.e., learning; Hypothesis 
3a) and non-practiced tasks (i.e., transfer; Hypothesis 3b). We expected this pattern of 
results to persist on the delayed posttest. 
 
Furthermore, we explored perceived mental effort investment in the test items to get 
more insight into the effects of self-explaining on learning (Question 4a) and transfer 
performance (Question 4b). On the one hand, it can be expected that the acquisition of 
knowledge of rules and strategies would lower the cognitive load imposed by the task, 
and therefore participants might have to invest less mental effort on the posttests than 
on the pretest (Paas et al., 2003a), especially after having engaged in self-explaining. 
On the other hand, as both our training-phase and the self-explanation prompts were 
designed to provoke Type 2 processing – which is more effortful than Type 1 processing 
(Evans, 2011) – participants might have been inclined to invest more effort on the 
posttests than on the pretest, especially on the non-practiced (i.e., transfer) tasks, on 
which participants had not acquired any knowledge during instruction. Finally, because 
the quality of self-explanations has been shown to be related to learning and transfer, 
we explored whether the quality of the self-explanations on the practice tasks correlated 
with the immediate and delayed posttest performance (Question 5). 
Materials and methods 
We created an Open Science Framework (OSF) page for this project, where all materials, 
a detailed description of the procedure, and the dataset of the experiment are provided 
(osf.io/85ce9). 
Participants and design 
Participants were all first-year ‘Safety and Security Management’ students of a Dutch 
University of Applied Sciences (N = 88). Five participants missed the second session 
and four participants failed to complete the experiment due to technical problems. 
Therefore, the final sample consisted of 79 students (Mage = 19.16, SD = 1.61; 44 males). 
Because this study took place in a real educational setting and was part of an existing 
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course, our sample was limited to the total number of students in this cohort. In response 
to a reviewer, we added a power function of our analyses using the G*Power software 
(Faul et al., 2009). The power of our 322 mixed ANOVAs – under a fixed alpha level 
of .05, with a correlation between measures of .3, and with a sample size of 79 – is 
estimated at .36, .99, and > .99 for picking up a small, medium, and large interaction 
effect, respectively. Regarding our 222 mixed ANOVAs, the power is estimated at .32, 
.96, and > .99 for picking up a small, medium, and large interaction effect, respectively. 
The power of our study, thus, should be sufficient to pick up medium-sized effects, which 
is in line with the mean weighted medium effect size of self-explaining of previous studies 
as indicated in a recent meta-analysis (Bisra et al., 2018). 
 
The experiment consisted of four phases: pretest, training-phase (CT-instructions plus 
practice), immediate posttest, and delayed posttest (see Table 1 for an overview). 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: (1) self-explaining 
condition (CT-instructions and CT-practice with self-explanation prompts; n = 39) and 
(2) no self-explaining condition (CT-instructions and CT-practice without self-explanation 
prompts; n = 40). Of the four task categories tested in the pretest and posttests 
participants received instruction and practice on two task categories (one involving 
statistical and one involving logical reasoning, see section CT- skills tests). To ensure 
that any condition effects would not be due to specific characteristics of the instructed 
and practiced tasks, half of the participants in each condition got instruction and 
practice on the first logical and the first probabilistic reasoning task category (i.e., 
syllogism and base-rate), and the other half on the second logical and the second 
probabilistic reasoning task category (i.e., Wason and conjunction). 
Materials 
CT-skills tests 
The pretest consisted of eight classic heuristics-and-biases tasks that reflected 
important aspects of CT across four categories (i.e., two of each category): 1) Syllogistic 
reasoning tasks, which examine the tendency to be influenced by the believability of a 
conclusion when evaluating the logical validity of arguments (adapted from Evans, 
2003); 2) Wason selection tasks, that measure the tendency to verify rules rather than to 
falsify them (adapted from Stanovich, 2011); 3) Base-rate tasks, which measure the 
tendency to overrate individual-case evidence (e.g., from personal experience, a single 
case, or prior beliefs) and to underrate statistical information (adapted from Fong et al., 
1986; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974); and 4) Conjunction tasks, that measure to what 
extent people neglect a fundamental rule in probability theory, that is, the conjunction 
rule (P(A&B)  P(B)) which states that the probability of Event A and Event B both 
occurring must be lower than the probability of Event A or Event B occurring alone 
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(adapted from Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). The syllogistic reasoning and Wason 
selection tasks involve logical reasoning (i.e., Wason selection tasks can be solved by 
applying modus ponens and modus tollens from syllogistic reasoning) and the base-rate 
and conjunction tasks involve statistical reasoning (i.e., both require knowledge of 
probability and data interpretation). The content of the surface features (cover stories) 
of all test items was adapted to the study domain of the participants. A multiple-choice 
format with four answer options was used, with only one correct answer, except for one 
base-rate task where two answers were correct. 
 
The immediate and delayed posttests were parallel versions of the pretest (i.e., 
structurally equivalent tasks but with different surface features). During the posttests, 
participants were additionally asked to motivate their MC-answers (“Why is this answer 
correct? Explain in steps how you have come to this answer.”) by typing their motivation 
in a text entry box below the MC-question. The posttest items on the practiced task 
categories served to assess differences in learning outcomes, whereas the posttest 
items on the non-practiced task categories served to assess transfer performance. The 
transfer task categories shared similar features with the learning categories, namely, one 
requiring knowledge and rules of logic (i.e., syllogisms rules) and one requiring 
knowledge and rules of statistics (i.e., probability and data interpretation). 
 
 
Table 1. Overview of the study design 
 Self-explaining  No self-explaining 
 A (n = 18) B (n = 21)  C (n = 22) D (n = 18) 
Pretest Syllogism, 
Wason, 
Base-rate, and 
Conjunction 
Syllogism, 
Wason, 
Base-rate, and 
Conjunction 
 Syllogism, 
Wason, 
Base-rate, and 
Conjunction 
Syllogism, 
Wason, 
Base-rate, and 
Conjunction 
Training phase 
Instruction and practice 
(version) 
Syllogism and 
Base-rate 
Wason and 
Conjunction 
 Syllogism and 
Base-rate 
Wason and 
Conjunction 
Self-explanation 
prompts during practice 
(condition) 
Yes Yes  No No 
Immediate posttest Syllogism, 
Wason, 
Base-rate, and 
Conjunction 
Syllogism, 
Wason, 
Base-rate, and 
Conjunction 
 Syllogism, 
Wason, 
Base-rate, and 
Conjunction 
Syllogism, 
Wason, 
Base-rate, and 
Conjunction 
Delayed posttest Syllogism, 
Wason, 
Base-rate, and 
Conjunction 
Syllogism, 
Wason, 
Base-rate, and 
Conjunction 
 Syllogism, 
Wason, 
Base-rate, and 
Conjunction 
Syllogism, 
Wason, 
Base-rate, and 
Conjunction 
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CT-instructions 
The text-based CT-instructions consisted of a general instruction on deductive and 
inductive reasoning and explicit instructions on two of the four categories from the 
pretest, including two extensive worked examples (of the tasks seen in the pretest) of 
each category. Participants received the following hints stating that the principles used 
in these tasks can be applied at several reasoning tasks: “Remember that these 
reasoning schemes can be applied in several reasoning tasks” and “Remember that the 
correct calculation of probabilities is an important skill that can be applied in several 
reasoning tasks”. 
 
CT-practice 
The CT-practice phase consisted of a case (315 words text) – on a topic that participants 
might encounter in their working-life – and four practice problems, two of each of the two 
task categories that students were given instructions on. In the self-explanation 
condition, participants were exposed to a self-explanation prompt after each of these 
tasks in which they were asked to explain how the answer was obtained: “Why is this 
answer correct? Explain in steps how you have come to this answer”. 
 
Mental effort 
After each test item participants reported how much mental effort they invested in 
completing that item, on a 9-point rating scale ranging from (1) very, very low effort to 
(9) very, very high effort (Paas, 1992; Paas & Van Merriënboer, 1993). 
Procedure 
The study was run during the first two lessons of a CT-course in the Safety and Security 
Management study program of an institute of higher professional education and 
conducted in the classroom with an entire class of students present. Participants signed 
an informed consent form at the start of the experiment. All materials were delivered in 
a computer-based environment (Qualtrics platform) that was created for this experiment, 
except for the paper-based case during the CT-instructions. The Qualtrics program 
randomly assigned the participants to a condition/version. Participants could work at 
their own pace, were allowed to use scrap paper while solving the tasks, and time-on-
task was logged during all phases. 
 
The study consisted of two sessions. In session 1 (during the first lesson of the course, 
ca. 90 min.), participants first completed the pretest. Subsequently, they had to read the 
CT-instructions and the case, followed by the practice problems, which differed 
according to the assigned condition/version. At the end, participants completed the 
immediate posttest. After two weeks, session 2 (during the second lesson of the course, 
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ca. 30 min.) was held in which participants completed the delayed posttest. Invested 
mental effort was rated after each test item on all CT-skills tests. Both the teacher and 
the experiment leader (first author of this paper) were present during all phases of the 
experiment. 
Scoring 
For selecting a correct MC-answer on the three CT-skills tests, 1 point was assigned, 
resulting in a maximum MC-score of four points on the learning (i.e., instructed/practiced 
task categories) items and four points on the transfer (i.e., task categories not 
instructed/practiced) items on each test. On the immediate and delayed posttest, 
participants were additionally asked to motivate their MC-answers. These motivations 
were scored based on a coding scheme that can be found on our OSF page. In addition 
to the MC-score (1 point), participants could earn a maximum of two points per question 
for the given motivation, resulting in a maximum total score (MC-plus-motivation) of three 
points per item. Because one syllogism task had to be removed from the tests due to an 
inconsistent variant in the delayed posttest (i.e., relatively easier form), participants who 
received instructions on the syllogistic reasoning and base-rate tasks, could attain a 
maximum total score of nine on the learning items and 12 on the transfer items on each 
posttest; and vice versa for the participants who received instructions on the Wason and 
conjunction tasks. For comparability, we computed percentage scores on the learning 
and transfer items instead of total scores. Two raters independently scored 25% of the 
immediate posttest. The intra-class correlation coefficient was .952 for the learning test 
items and .971 for the transfer test items. Because of these high inter-rater reliabilities, 
the remainder of the tests was scored by one rater. 
 
The quality of participants’ explanations was determined on the basis of the self-
explanations given during the practice tasks with a maximum of two points per task (cf. 
posttest explanation-scoring procedure). As there were four practice tasks, the 
maximum self-explanation score was eight (ranging from 0 to 8). Two raters 
independently scored 25% of the tasks. Because the inter-rater reliability was high (intra-
class correlation coefficient of .899), the remainder of the tasks was scored by one rater. 
Results 
For all analyses in this paper a p-value of .05 was used as a threshold for statistical 
significance. Partial eta-squared (p2) is reported as a measure of effect size for the 
ANOVAs, for which .01 is considered small, .06 medium, and .14 large, and Cohen’s d 
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is reported for the post-hoc tests, with values of 0.20, 0.50, and 0.80 representing a 
small, medium, and large effect size respectively (Cohen, 1988). 
 
Preliminary analyses confirmed that there were no significant differences between the 
conditions before the start of the experiment in educational background, (3) = 2.41, p 
= .493, gender, (1) = 0.16, p = .900, or performance, time-on-task, and mental effort 
on the pretest (all Fs < 1, maximum p2 = .01). An independent-samples t-test indicated, 
surprisingly, that there were no significant differences in time-on-task (in seconds) spent 
on practice of the instruction tasks between the self-explaining condition (M = 409.25, 
SD = 273.45) and the no self-explaining condition (M = 404.89, SD = 267.13), t(77) = 
0.07, p = .943, d = 0.02. 
Test performance 
Data are provided in Table 2 and test statistics in Table 3. Regarding the version of the 
instruction, only main effects of Version or interactions of Version with other factors are 
reported. The remaining results are provided in Table 3. 
 
Performance gains on MC-answers 
To test hypotheses 1, 2a, and 2b, two 322 mixed ANOVAs were conducted with Test 
Moment (pretest, immediate posttest, and delayed posttest) as within-subjects factor 
and Self-explaining (self-explaining and no self-explaining) and Version (syllogism and 
base-rate: SB, and Wason selection and conjunction: WC) as between-subjects factors.  
 
Test Moment significantly affected learning (i.e., performance on practiced tasks): 
performance was lower on the pretest (M = 40.40, SD = 29.09) than on the immediate 
posttest (M = 78.06, SD = 26.22), p < .001, p2 = .65. Performance on the immediate 
posttest did not differ significantly from that on the delayed posttest (M = 79.54, SD = 
25.17), p = .611, p2 < .01. Note though, that there was an interaction between Test 
Moment and Version; participants who received the SB-version showed an immediate to 
delayed posttest performance gain (Mimmediate = 74.16; Mdelayed = 78.28), whereas the WC-
version showed a slight performance drop (Mimmediate = 82.54; Mdelayed = 81.45); however, 
follow-up tests showed that the gain and drop were non-significant, F(1, 38) = 13.12, p 
= .001, p2 = .26; F(1, 37) = 0.07, p = .794, p2 = .002. There was no main effect of Self-
explaining nor an interaction between Test Moment and Self-explaining, indicating that 
prompting self-explanations did not affect learning gains. 
 
There was a main effect of Test Moment on test performance on transfer (i.e., non-
practiced) items. Performance was lower on the pretest (M = 36.71, SD = 27.07) than on 
the immediate posttest (M = 49.37, SD = 30.16), p < .001, p2 = .17, which in turn was 
lower than on the delayed posttest (M = 58.02, SD = 29.07), p = .004, p2 = .11. There 
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was a main effect of Version: receiving the WC-version resulted in higher transfer 
performance (M = 57.98, SE = 3.46) than the SB-version (M = 38.47, SE = 3.42), 
indicating that transfer from WC-tasks to SB-tasks was higher than from SB-tasks to WC-
tasks. Moreover, there was an interaction between Test Moment and Version. Follow-up 
analyses showed an effect of Test Moment for both the SB-version, F(2, 76) = 10.74, p 
< .001, p2 = .22, and the WC-version, F(2, 74) = 16.58, p < .001, p2 = .31. The pretest 
to immediate posttest performance gain was only significant for the SB-version, F(1, 38) 
= 16.32, p = .001, p2 = .30, whereas the immediate to delayed posttest performance 
gain was only significant for the WC-version, F(1, 37) = 17.64, p < .001, p2 = .32. There 
was no main effect of Self-explaining nor a significant interaction between Test Moment 
and Self-explaining, indicating that prompting self-explanations did not affect transfer 
performance. 
 
Effects of self-explaining on learning outcomes (MC-plus-motivation) 
To test hypothesis 3a, we analyzed the data of the MC-plus-motivation scores on 
learning items using a 222 mixed ANOVA with Test Moment (immediate posttest and 
delayed posttest) as within-subjects factor and Self-explaining (self-explaining and no 
self-explaining) and Version (syllogism and base-rate: SB, and Wason selection and 
conjunction: WC) as between-subjects factors (see Table 2 and 3 for data and test 
statistics, respectively). Pretest scores were not included in this analysis because the 
pretest only consisted of MC-questions. There was no main effect of Test Moment. Self-
explaining significantly affected performance on learning items. Surprisingly, 
performance was higher in the no self-explaining condition (M = 64.36, SE = 3.26), 
compared to the self-explaining condition (M = 54.87, SE = 3.30). Note though, that there 
was an interaction between Self-explaining and Version. The effect of self-explaining was 
only found for the WC-version, F(1, 37) = 7.66, p = .009, p2 = .17; there was no main 
effect of self-explaining for the SB-version, F(1, 38) = 0.01, p = .953, p2 < .01. We did 
not find an interaction between Test Moment and Self-explaining. 
 
Effects of self-explaining on transfer performance (MC-plus-motivation) 
To test hypothesis 3b, we analyzed the data of the MC-plus-motivation scores on the 
transfer items using a 222 mixed ANOVA with Test Moment (immediate posttest and 
delayed posttest) as within-subjects factor and Self-explaining (self-explaining and no 
self-explaining) and Version (syllogism and base-rate: SB, and Wason selection and 
conjunction: WC) as between-subjects factors (see Table 2 and 3 for data and test 
statistics, respectively). There were no main effects of Test Moment and Self-explaining 
nor an interaction between Test Moment and Self-explaining. Collectively, the results on 
the transfer items again suggest that transfer occurred to a comparable extent in the 
self-explaining condition and the no self-explaining condition. Note though, that there 
was a main effect of version of instruction. In line with the findings on the MC-scores 
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data, performance was higher for the WC-version (M = 49.95, SE = 3.31) than the SB-
version (M = 25.60, SE = 3.27), indicating that transfer was higher when instructed or 
practiced with the WC-tasks compared to the SB-tasks. 
 
Mental effort investment 
Again, data are provided in Table 2 and test statistics in Table 3. We exploratively 
analyzed the mental effort data (average mental effort invested per learning item) using 
two 322 mixed ANOVAs with Test Moment (pretest, immediate posttest, and delayed 
posttest) as within-subjects factor and Self-explaining (self-explaining and no self-
explaining) and Version (syllogism and base-rate: SB, and Wason selection and 
conjunction: WC) as between-subjects factors (Question 4a and 4b). Regarding the 
version of the instruction, only main effects of Version or interactions of Version with other 
factors are reported. The remaining results are available in Table 3. One participant had 
more than two missing values and was removed from the analysis.  
 
There were no main effects of Test Moment or Self-explaining on effort invested in 
learning items, nor an interaction between Test Moment and Self-explaining. Note tough, 
that there was a main effect of version of instruction. Less effort investment on learning 
items was reported for the WC-version (M = 3.65, SE = 0.17) than the SB-version (M = 
4.52, SE = 0.17). Moreover, there was an interaction between Self-explaining and 
Version. The effect of self-explaining was only found for the WC-version, F(1, 36) = 5.08, 
p = .030, p2 = .12; there was no main effect of self-explaining for the SB-version, 
F(1, 38) = 1.26, p = .268, p2 = .03. 
 
Regarding effort invested in transfer items, Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption 
of sphericity had been violated, 2 (2) = 7.45, p = .024, and therefore Huynh-Feldt 
corrected tests are reported ( = .95). Mental effort was affected by Test Moment. 
Invested mental effort was lower on the pretest (M = 3.98, SE = 0.14) compared to the 
immediate posttest (M = 4.63, SE = 0.15), p < .001, p2 = .21, which did not differ from 
that on the delayed posttest (M = 4.38, SE = 0.17), p = .160, p2 = .03. There was no 
main effect of Self- explaining nor an interaction between Test Moment and Self-
explaining 
Quality of self-explanations 
Several authors have reported that self-explanations are only beneficial when the quality 
of the explanations is sufficient (e.g., Schworm & Renkl, 2007). To examine whether we 
could corroborate this finding, we conducted an exploratory analysis. Based on the 
quality of the self-explanations in the instruction tasks, we created three groups: (1) 
highest self-explanation scores (score  4; 25% of the total group), (2) scores between 
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2 and 3 (42% of the total group), and (3) lowest self-explanation scores (score  1; 33% 
of the total group). We examined whether the quality of the self-explanations was related 
to performance on the learning (practiced) items by conducting a mixed ANOVA (on 
participants in the self-explanation condition) with Test Moment (immediate posttest and 
delayed posttest) as within-subjects factor and Quality of Self-explanations (high, 
medium, and low) as between-subjects factor. There was no main effect of Test Moment, 
F(1, 36) = 0.02, p = .881, p2 <.01, but there was a main effect of Quality of Self-
explanations, F(2, 36) = 8.79, p = .001, p2 = .33. The group with the lowest self-
explanation scores performed lower on learning items (M = 36.86, SE = 5.38) than the 
group with the medium self-explanation scores (M = 59.55, SE = 4.85), p < .001. The 
group with the medium self-explanation scores did not differ from the group with the 
highest self-explanation scores (M = 69.17, SE = 6.13), p = .226. No interaction between 
Test Moment and Quality of Self-explanations was found, F(2, 36) = 1.26, p = .297, p2 = 
.06. 
 
A similar mixed ANOVA was conducted to explore whether the quality of the self-
explanations was related to performance on the transfer (non-practiced) items. There 
was no main effect of Test Moment, F(1, 36) = 2.73, p = .107, p2 = .07, no main effect 
of Quality of Self-explanations, F(2, 36) = 0.01, p = .994, p2 < .01, nor an interaction 
between Test Moment and Quality of Self-explanations, F(2, 36) = 0.61, p = .550, p2 = 
.03.
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Discussion  
Previous research has shown that creating desirable difficulty in instruction by having 
learners generate explanations of a problem-solution to themselves (i.e., self-explaining) 
rather than simply answering tasks passively, is effective to foster learning and transfer 
in several domains (Fiorella & Mayer, 2016). Regarding unbiased reasoning, Heijltjes 
and colleagues (2014a) demonstrated that self-explaining during practice had a positive 
effect on transfer of unbiased reasoning, but this effect was short-lived and not 
replicated in other studies (Heijltjes et al., 2014b, 2015). However, these findings were 
based on MC-answers only, and there are indications that effects of self-explaining on 
transfer may be detected when more sensitive MC-plus-motivation tests are used 
(Hoogerheide et al., 2014). With the present experiment, we aimed to find out whether 
instruction followed by self-explaining during practice with heuristics-and-biases tasks 
would be effective for learning and transfer, using final tests that required participants to 
motivate their MC-answers. 
 
Consistent with earlier research, our results corroborate the idea that explicit CT-
instruction combined with practice is beneficial for learning to avoid biased reasoning 
(Hypothesis 1), as we found pretest to immediate posttest gains on practiced tasks, 
remaining stable on the delayed posttest after two weeks, as measured by performance 
on the MC-only questions. This is in line with the notion that the acquisition of relevant 
mindware contributes to an adequate use of Type 2 processing which can prevent 
biased reasoning (Stanovich et al., 2008). Contrary to earlier findings (e.g., Heijltjes et 
al., 2014a), our experiment seemed to provide some evidence that these instructions 
and practice tasks may also enhance transfer. However, this only applied to participants 
who practiced with the syllogism and base-rate version. For participants who received 
the other version, transfer performance gains were reached at a later stage. As such, 
this may mean that either transfer was easier from syllogism and base-rate to Wason and 
conjunction or, given that this pattern is not consistent across analyses, that our findings 
may reflect non-systematic variance. Another reason why caution is warranted in 
interpreting this finding is that the maximum scores differed per version, which, even 
though we used percentage scores, might be an issue for comparability. 
 
As for our main question, we did not find any indications that prompting self-explanations 
to increase the difficulty of the practice tasks had a differential effect – compared to the 
control condition – on learning (Hypothesis 2a) or transfer (Hypothesis 2b) performance 
gains. Nor did the analyses of the MC-plus-motivation data show a benefit of prompting 
self-explanations during practice for learning (Hypothesis 3a) or transfer (Hypothesis 
3b). Surprisingly, our findings even suggest that self-explaining during practice may 
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actually be less beneficial for learning: participants who received self-explanation 
prompts benefitted less from the instructions than those who were not prompted; 
however, this was only the case for one of the versions, so again, this finding needs to 
be interpreted with caution. 
 
The findings of the present study are contrary to previous studies that demonstrated that 
self-explaining is effective for establishing both learning and transfer in a variety of 
domains (for a review see Fiorella & Mayer, 2016), but they are in line with the studies 
on unbiased reasoning (which assessed performance only by means of MC-answers) 
that demonstrated no positive effects (Heijltjes et al., 2014b, 2015) or only a short-lived 
effect of self-explaining on transfer (Heijltjes et al., 2014a). We did find that learners who 
gave lower quality self-explanations also performed worse on the learning items on the 
test (Question 5), which seems to corroborate the idea that a higher quality of self-
explanations is related to higher performance (Schworm & Renkl, 2007), but it is possible 
that this finding reflects a priori knowledge or ability difference rather than an effect of 
the quality of self-explanations on performance. Thus, this study (with a more extensive 
performance measure) contributes to a small body of evidence that self-explanation 
prompts seem to have little or no benefit for acquiring unbiased reasoning skills. 
 
One possible reason for the lack of a self-explanation effect could be the fact that the 
learners did not receive feedback on their self-explanations given in the practice phase. 
Providing feedback after students’ self-explanations could have contributed to 
consolidating correct explanations and correcting or elaborating incorrect or incomplete 
explanations (e.g., Hattie & Timperley, 2007), which is of great importance in the domain 
of unbiased reasoning—arguably even more so than in other learning domains. 
 
Another possibility might be that the nature of the tasks moderates effects of self-
explaining. Contrary to previous studies, transfer on the tasks in the present study relies 
not only on deep understanding of the domain-specific knowledge involved in the task, 
but also on the ability to inhibit Type 1 processing and to switch to Type 2 processing. 
Possibly, prompting students to self-explain did not provoke the ‘stop and think’ reaction 
that was needed for transfer above and beyond what the instructions already 
accomplished. Our findings regarding effort investment support this idea (i.e., higher 
effort investment on transfer items on the posttests compared to the pretest in both 
conditions), suggesting that our training-phase provoked Type 2 processing, but there 
was no (additional) effect of the self-explanation prompts on effort investment. 
 
A strength of the present study worth mentioning, is that – contrary to previous studies 
(e.g., Chi et al., 1994) – both conditions spent equal time on the practice tasks. Hence, 
it could be hypothesized that the beneficial effects of self-explaining in these studies are 
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not direct but caused by mediation: generating explanations usually requires more time 
and spending more time on subject matter increases performance. According to this 
hypothesis, the effect of self-explaining should disappear when time-on-task is equated 
between the conditions. Indeed, Matthews and Rittle-Johnson (2009) observed that 
solving tasks with self-explanations and solving more tasks without explanations in the 
same amount of time, resulted in equal final test performance. However, there are mixed 
results within the few studies that equated time-on-task, with some studies finding 
beneficial effects of self-explaining, while others did not (e.g., De Bruin et al., 2007; De 
Koning et al., 2011; McEldoorn et al., 2013; Matthews & Rittle-Johnson, 2009) and most 
other studies on self-explaining did not (fully) report time-on-task (see Bisra et al., 2018). 
Thus, there is a definite need for more research that examines the interplay between self-
explanation, time-on-task, and final test performance. 
 
Another possibility why we did not find effects of self-explaining on learning of unbiased 
reasoning skills, however, is that our study was conducted as part of an existing course 
and the learning materials were part of the exam. Because of that, students of the control 
condition may have imposed desirable difficulties on themselves, for instance by 
covertly trying to come up with explanations for the questions. It seems likely that 
students would be more willing to invest effort when their performance on the learning 
materials actually matters (intrinsically or extrinsically) for them, which is often the case 
in field experiments conducted in real classrooms where the learning materials are 
related to the students’ study domain. Therefore, it is possible that effects of desirable 
difficulties such as self-explaining found in the psychological laboratory – where 
students participate to earn required research credits and the learning materials are not 
part of their study program and sometimes even unrelated to their study domain – might 
not readily transfer to classroom studies. This would explain why previous studies, which 
are mostly laboratory studies, demonstrated effects of self-explaining and why these 
effects were mostly absent and in one case only short-lived in the classroom studies on 
unbiased reasoning (e.g., Heijltjes et al., 2014a, 2014b, 2015). Moreover, this finding 
suggests a theoretical implication, namely that beneficial effects of creating desirable 
difficulty in instruction might become smaller when the willingness to invest increases 
and vice versa. 
 
Future work might investigate why self-explanation prompts as used in the present study 
seem to have no additional effect after instruction and practice and whether strategies 
to improve students’ quality of self-explanations would have beneficial effects on 
learning, and especially, transfer performance. Enhancing the quality of the self-
explanations could be accomplished by, for example, providing students with a self-
explanation training in advance or by providing prompts that include some instructional 
assistance (cf. Berthold et al., 2009). Moreover, future research could investigate via 
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classroom studies whether other desirable difficulties would be more beneficial for 
establishing learning and transfer of unbiased reasoning. In contrast to prompting self-
explanations, other desirable difficulties such as creating task variability during practice 
and spacing of learning sessions apart, may result in beneficial effects since students 
of the control conditions cannot impose these desirable difficulties themselves (e.g., 
Weissgerber et al., 2018). 
 
To conclude, based on the findings from the present study in combination with prior 
studies, prompting to self-explain during practice does not seem to be promising to 
enhance unbiased reasoning skills. This suggests that the nature of the task may be a 
boundary condition for effects of self-explaining on learning and transfer. Moreover, this 
study raises the question whether effects of self-explaining depend on the setting of the 
study, and thus contribute to knowledge about the usefulness of desirable difficulties in 
real educational settings. Considerably more research is needed to investigate how 
unbiased reasoning should be taught and especially how transfer can be fostered. This 
is important, because biased reasoning can have huge negative consequences in 
situations in both daily life and complex professional environments.
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As outlined in the introduction, it is essential that higher education students are trained 
to become critically-thinking professionals. Critical thinking (CT) is crucial for 
succeeding in future careers and, moreover, is an important life skill (Davies, 2013; 
Facione, 1990; Halpern, 2014; Van Gelder, 2005). More specifically, students should be 
able to avoid biases in their reasoning and decision-making, even in situations that have 
not been encountered before, because especially in (professional) situations, reasoning 
biases can have serious consequences. However, it would be unfeasible to train 
students on each and every type of reasoning bias they will ever encounter. The 
challenge for educational practitioners, therefore, is to design instruction/practice so that 
students acquire the necessary resources to enhance CT in such a way that it would 
also transfer across tasks and contexts. 
 
The overarching purpose of the research presented in this dissertation was to acquire 
more knowledge on how higher education students’ learning and transfer of CT-skills 
can be fostered, focusing specifically on one important aspect of CT: the ability to avoid 
bias in reasoning. The studies in Chapters 2 to 5 examined whether instructional 
interventions that are known to foster generative processing and transfer of other 
cognitive skills, would further enhance learning and transfer of CT-skills required for 
unbiased reasoning (i.e., above and beyond effects of instruction and practice). These 
interventions were administered after initial instruction, during the practice phase. 
Through generative processing, learners actively construct meaning from to-be-learned 
information, by mentally organizing it in coherent knowledge structures and integrating 
these principles with existing knowledge (Grabowski, 1996; Osborne & Wittrock, 1983; 
Wittrock, 1974, 1990, 1992, 2010), which is required for transfer of learned skills. In 
addition, the study presented in Chapter 6 experimentally examined what obstacle(s) 
prevent(s) successful transfer of these CT-skills. In this final chapter, the main findings 
of the studies are presented and positioned in the broader literature first. Subsequently, 
the implications for research and educational practice are discussed, along with 
potential directions for future research. 
Summary of main findings 
The main question addressed in this dissertation, was to investigate how (i.e., which 
instructional strategies could be used) to further enhance learning of unbiased reasoning 
and to establish transfer to novel problem types. Instructional strategies that encourage 
generative processing seem to hold a considerable promise with respect to deep 
learning and transfer of other cognitive skills (e.g., Fiorella & Mayer, 2016; Wittrock, 
2010), but their effects on the acquisition of CT-skills had hardly been investigated. The 
generative processing strategies investigated in the studies presented in this 
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dissertation were: prompting students to self-explain during practice (Chapter 2), 
creating variability in practice (Chapter 3), stimulating comparison of correct problem 
solutions with erroneous ones (Chapter 4), and having students repeatedly retrieve to-
be-learned material from memory (Chapter 5). In all of these studies, students 
participated in a pretest-intervention-posttest design. During the intervention, students 
were provided with instruction on the importance and features of CT, on the skills and 
attitudes needed to think critically, and on specific heuristics-and-biases tasks. 
Subsequently, they performed practice activities on domain-relevant problems in the 
task category/categories they were given instructions on, either with or without the 
respective generative processing strategies. Unbiased reasoning has been 
operationalized as performance on classic heuristics-and-biases tasks (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974), in which an intuitively cued heuristic response conflicts normative 
models of CT as set by formal logic and probability theory. Students’ performance (both 
on task categories that were part of the practice phase to assess learning and novel task 
categories that share underlying principles to assess transfer) and perceived mental 
effort were measured on a pretest and posttest. Additionally, Chapters 2 to 4 included 
delayed posttests. 
 
The classroom study presented in Chapter 2 addressed the question of whether 
prompting students to self-explain during practice; that is, to generate explanations of a 
problem-solution to themselves (e.g., Bisra et al., 2018; Chi, 2000; Fiorella & Mayer, 
2016) would be effective for fostering (transfer of) unbiased reasoning. Students were 
provided with instruction on the importance and features of CT, on the skills and attitudes 
needed to think critically, and on several heuristics-and-biases tasks. Subsequently, they 
performed practice activities on domain-relevant problems in the task categories they 
were given instructions on, either with or without self-explanation prompts. Results 
revealed that learning outcomes improved after instruction/practice (i.e., from pretest to 
posttest) and remained stable after a two-week delay. In contrast to previous findings in 
a variety of domains (for a review see Bisra et al., 2018), however, prompting self-
explanations had no differential effect – compared to the control condition that did not 
receive prompts – on learning gains or transfer performance. Remarkably, mental effort 
investment did not differ across conditions. That raises the possibility that students in the 
control condition had also engaged in generative processing, for instance by covertly 
trying to come up with explanations for the questions. Additionally, it was explored 
whether the quality of students’ self-explanations was related to their performance. 
Results indicated that this was the case: learners who gave lower quality self-
explanations also performed worse on the learning (but not on transfer) items on the test, 
which seems to corroborate the idea that a higher quality of self-explanations is related 
to higher performance (Schworm & Renkl, 2007). It is possible, however, that this finding 
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reflects a priori knowledge or ability difference rather than an effect of the quality of self-
explanations on performance. 
 
In Chapter 3, two experiments (laboratory and classroom) tested whether creating 
variability during practice through interleaved practice (in which practice task categories 
vary from trial to trial, as opposed to blocked practice; e.g., Barreiros et al., 2007; 
Helsdingen et al., 2011; Rau et al., 2013) would be effective for fostering unbiased 
reasoning. While interleaved practice has been shown to enhance learning (e.g., 
Helsdingen et al., 2011a, 2011b) it is usually more cognitively demanding than blocked 
practice, and a very high cognitive load may hinder learning (Paas et al., 2003a). 
Therefore, it was additionally examined whether learners would experience lower 
cognitive load and benefit more from interleaved practice, when using worked examples 
as opposed to practice problems (cf. Paas & Van Merriënboer, 1994). Worked examples 
have been shown to reduce ineffective cognitive load (compared to practice problems; 
Van Gog et al., 2019). After receiving explicit instruction on CT and specific heuristics-
and-biases tasks, students either practiced in an interleaved schedule with worked 
examples, an interleaved schedule with problems, a blocked schedule with worked 
examples, or a blocked schedule with problems. In both experiments, learning outcomes 
again improved after instruction/practice (i.e., from pretest to posttest). However, 
contrary to expectations and previous findings (e.g., Barreiros et al., 2007; Likourezos 
et al., 2019; Moxley, 1979), there were no indications that interleaved practice led to 
better learning or transfer than blocked practice, irrespective of task format. 
Interestingly, the laboratory experiment demonstrated a benefit of studying worked 
examples over solving problems on learning outcomes, reached with less effort during 
the tests (i.e., more effective and efficient: Hoffman & Schraw, 2010; Paas & Van 
Merriënboer, 1993; Van Gog & Paas, 2008). The classroom experiment replicated this 
worked example efficiency and demonstrated that this was the case for novices, but not 
for learners with relatively more prior knowledge. Hence, these experiments were the 
first to show that the worked example effect also applies to novices’ training of CT-skills 
(e.g., Paas & Van Gog, 2006; Renkl, 2014; Van Gog et al., 2019). The observation from 
the second (i.e., classroom) experiment also supports findings regarding the expertise 
reversal effect (e.g., Kalyuga et al., 2003, 2012), which shows that while instructional 
strategies that assist learners in developing cognitive schemata are effective for low-
knowledge learners, they are often not effective for higher-knowledge learners. 
 
The classroom study reported in Chapter 4 investigated whether comparing correct and 
erroneous examples (i.e., contrasting examples) would enhance unbiased reasoning 
more than studying correct examples only, studying erroneous examples only, and 
solving practice problems. Students were provided with the CT-instructions and practice 
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on domain-relevant problems, under one of the four conditions. Results revealed that 
students’ learning outcomes again improved from pretest to posttest. Moreover, their 
performance improved even further after a three-week and nine-month delay, although 
the latter finding could also be attributed to the further instructions that were given in 
courses in-between the three-week and nine-month follow up. Unexpectedly, however, 
results did not reveal any differences among conditions on either learning outcomes or 
transfer performance and, thus, differ from findings of previous studies (e.g., Durkin & 
Rittle-johnson, 2012; Kawasaki, 2010; Loibl & Leuders, 2018, 2019; Siegler, 2002). 
Moreover, it is surprising that this study did not reveal a beneficial effect of studying 
correct examples as opposed to practicing with problems (i.e., worked example effect), 
which is contrary to the finding in Chapter 3 and findings of previous studies on many 
other tasks (e.g., Renkl, 2014; Van Gog et al., 2019). 
 
In Chapter 5, a classroom study was described that empirically investigated whether 
repeated retrieval practice over time (i.e., working on practice tasks in sessions that were 
weeks apart), would be beneficial for learning to reason in an unbiased manner and 
whether it can additionally facilitate transfer. Students were instructed on CT and 
avoiding belief-bias in syllogistic reasoning and practiced with syllogisms on domain-
relevant problems. After each practice-task, they received correct-answer feedback and 
were given a worked example. Depending on assigned condition, they did not engage 
in extra practice, practiced a second time (week later), or practiced a second (week 
later) and third time (two weeks after second time). Consistent with previous repeated 
retrieval findings (e.g., Butler, 2010; McDaniel et al., 2012, 2013; Roediger & Butler, 
2011), results revealed that average performance scores during practice sessions 
increased with more repetitions. However, repeated retrieval practice did not have a 
significant effect, compared to practicing just once, on learning outcomes on the final 
test, as judged by total scores (MC-answers plus justification). Exploring performance 
on MC-answers only revealed pretest to posttest learning gains, suggesting that 
students did benefit from instruction/practice but may have been unable to justify their 
answers. Effects on transfer could not be tested due to a floor effect. It seems possible 
that the feedback after each practice task eliminated the effects of repeated retrieval, in 
line with findings from recent research (Kliegl et al., 2019; Pastötter & Bäuml, 2016; Storm 
et al., 2014), since students spent more time on worked-example feedback after 
incorrect than correct retrievals. 
 
The study in Chapter 6 focused exclusively on identifying whether unsuccessful transfer 
of CT-skills would be due to a failure to recognize that acquired knowledge is relevant in 
a new context, to recall that knowledge, or to apply that knowledge to the new context 
(i.e., the three-step model of transfer; Barnett & Ceci, 2012). In two experiments 
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(classroom and laboratory), students received explicit instructions on CT and avoiding 
belief-bias in syllogistic reasoning and practiced with syllogisms on domain-relevant 
problems. This time, students’ performance was measured on syllogisms with different 
story contexts (to assess learning), syllogisms in a different format (to assess near 
transfer), and novel tasks that shared similar features with syllogisms (to assess far 
transfer) both on a pretest and immediate posttest. On the posttest transfer items, 
students received no support, received hints that the information provided in the learning 
phase is relevant for these items (recognition support), received hints that the information 
provided in the learning phase is relevant and were prompted to recall the acquired 
knowledge (free recall), or received hints that the information provided in the learning 
phase is relevant and receiving a reminder of the paper-based overview of that 
information that they received (recall support). The effects of support for different steps 
in the process were compared to infer where difficulties arise for learners (cf. Butler et 
al, 2013, 2017). Additionally, it was explored (within the free recall condition) whether 
students’ ability to recall the acquired knowledge was related to their posttest 
performance on near and far transfer items. Over the two experiments, learning and near 
transfer outcomes improved after instruction/practice (i.e., from pretest to posttest). 
Results even showed some increase on far transfer items, but the far transfer scores 
were overall rather low, so there was still a lot of room for improvement. Interestingly, 
students did not benefit from recognition and recall support while solving transfer tasks 
(i.e., there were no significant differences among conditions). This finding suggests that 
students were able to recognize that the acquired knowledge was relevant to the new 
task and to recall that knowledge, but had difficulties in applying the relevant knowledge 
to the new tasks. However, findings from the free recall condition do not fully support the 
idea that it is only an application/mapping problem. Most students did not retrieve all 
relevant information from memory, and exploratory analyses pointed to moderate-to-
large positive correlations between students’ retrieved knowledge and their performance 
on near and far transfer items. This may suggest that suboptimal recall is at least partially 
responsible for unsuccessful transfer as well. Descriptive statistics support this idea: 
students who received recall support had higher (though not significantly higher) scores 
than the other conditions on far transfer items at posttest in the laboratory study and on 
near transfer items at posttest in the classroom study. 
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Discussion of main findings 
Together, the studies in this dissertation seem to corroborate findings of previous studies 
on teaching CT in general (Abrami et al., 2014, 2018) and unbiased reasoning in 
particular (Heijltjes et al., 2014a, 2014b, 2015) that providing students with explicit CT-
instruction and the opportunity to practice with domain-relevant problems improves 
learning outcomes. Although we did not include a no-instruction/practice control 
condition, students did show pretest to posttest performance gains on 
practiced/instructed items, and their performance remained stable or improved even 
further after a delay of (several) weeks (Chapters 2 to 4). Regarding the effect of 
instruction/practice on transfer, the study in Chapter 6 showed a noticeable progress on 
near transfer from pretest to posttest, that is, after instructions and practice activities12. 
However, there were no or very limited indications of progress on far transfer (Chapters 
2 and 6, respectively)13, which is in line with findings of previous studies that examined 
effects on far transfer (Heijltjes et al., 2014a, 2014b, 2015). Taken together, this research 
extends prior research on teaching for transfer of CT-skills and confirms that transfer 
between closely related situations occurred more often than transfer between situations 
that had less in common (Barnett & Ceci, 2002; Bray, 1928; Dinsmore et al., 2014). 
 
Remarkably, the generative processing strategies did not work as expected: Chapters 
2 to 5 found no indications that these strategies – be it self-explaining during practice, 
interleaved practice, comparing correct and erroneous examples, or repeated retrieval 
practice – further improved learning or transfer of CT-skills. It has been well established 
that encouraging generative processing fosters knowledge acquisition and transfer of 
various cognitive skills (e.g., Fiorella & Mayer, 2016; Wittrock, 2010). As such, it is 
somewhat surprising that generative processing strategies did not seem beneficial for 
fostering CT-skills. 
 
There are several possible explanations for this absence of differential effects of 
generative processing strategies on learning and transfer. The possible strategy-specific 
explanations and preconditions have been addressed in the respective chapters, so I 
will not repeat them here, but instead, I will focus on the overarching issues. First, it 
seems possible that the CT-instructions, which included worked examples, already had 
a substantial effect on learning unbiased reasoning, making it difficult to find differential 
effects of different types of practice activities. Most studies on the effects of generative 
processing strategies with other types of cognitive tasks use pure practice conditions or 
                                               
12 Near transfer items were only included in the tests of the study presented in Chapter 6. 
13 The studies presented in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 did not include transfer items in the pretest and were, therefore, not 
able to detect transfer gains. 
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give minimal instructions prior to practice (e.g., Fiorella & Mayer, 2016). Thus, the effects 
are usually not investigated in a context in which elaborate processing of instructions 
precedes practice, as in the studies in this dissertation. 
 
Second, the absence of differential effects of generative processing on learning may be 
related to the affective and attitudinal dimension of CT. Being able to think critically relies 
on the extent to which one possesses the requisite skills and is able to use these skills, 
but also on whether one is inclined to use these skills (i.e., thinking dispositions; Perkins 
et al., 1983). It is possible, for instance, that generative processing would only benefit 
students who score high on thinking dispositions (such as need for cognition, Cacioppo 
& Petty, 1982, or actively open-minded thinking, Stanovich & West, 2007). A possible 
interaction between generative processing strategies and thinking dispositions could not 
be investigated in this dissertation, however, because thinking dispositions were not 
assessed. 
 
Third, in some studies, the classroom setting might explain why there were no differential 
effects of generative processing. In Chapter 2, I already pointed to the possibility that 
because the study was conducted in an existing CT-course (as in all classroom studies 
part of this dissertation), students’ willingness to invest effort in their performance may 
have been higher than generally in psychological laboratory studies. The learning 
materials from the study were also relevant for the course/exam and their performance 
actually mattered (intrinsically or extrinsically) to them. Not so much on the posttest of 
this study, which did not have consequences for their exam grade, but on such tasks in 
general. As such, students in the control condition may have engaged in generative 
processing themselves, for instance by covertly trying to come up with explanations for 
the questions. It is therefore possible that effects of generative processing strategies 
such as self-explaining found in the psychological laboratory – where students 
participate to earn required research credits and the learning materials are not part of 
their study program – might not readily transfer to field experiments conducted in real 
classrooms. This could be a possible explanation for the lack of effects of contrasting 
examples (Chapter 4) as well, in which the control conditions may have tried to compare 
the given correct (or erroneous) examples with internally represented erroneous (or 
correct) solutions. I will discuss recommendations for future research based on this 
assumption later in this chapter. It should be noted though, that the above argument 
probably cannot fully explain the absence of differential effects of interleaved practice 
(Chapter 3) and repeated retrieval practice (Chapter 5), where motivational aspects are 
less crucial. To illustrate, in Chapter 3, students in the control condition practiced in a 
blocked schedule and could not easily engage in interleaved practice themselves. 
Moreover, Chapter 3 included both a classroom and laboratory study and consistently 
demonstrated a lack of differential effects and, therefore, the classroom setting argument 
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cannot fully explain the absence of differential effects of this generative processing 
strategy. 
 
A possible reason for the lack of transfer to novel problem types in general, might be 
related to the duration or extensiveness of the practice activities. Even though substantial 
evidence is provided that students learned to solve abstract heuristics-and-biases tasks 
(Chapters 2 to 6) and tasks closely related to those instructed (Chapter 6), their subject-
matter knowledge may have been insufficient for solving more complex or novel CT-
tasks. That might explain the considerably low levels of performance on far transfer items 
in all chapters. As such, it can be argued that establishing transfer to novel problem 
types needs longer or more extensive practice. Additionally, Chapter 6 implies that 
instructional interventions aimed at far transfer of CT-skills should focus on recall of the 
acquired knowledge and application of that knowledge onto novel tasks, since students 
seem to have most difficulty with these steps in the transfer process (for the three-step 
model of transfer, see Barnett & Ceci, 2012). These explanations are not mutually 
exclusive and should be investigated further in future research. I will elaborate on this 
when giving suggestions for future work. Nonetheless, the series of studies presented in 
this dissertation do show – contrary to the assertion made by Halpern and Butler (2019) 
that teaching CT-skills explicitly with multiple examples from different contexts will 
facilitate transfer to novel contexts – that establishing transfer of CT-skills to novel 
problem types is no easy feat, at least with regard to skills required for unbiased 
reasoning. 
 
Taken together, providing students with explicit CT-instruction and opportunities to 
practice with domain-relevant problems is beneficial for learning unbiased reasoning, 
but what kind of practice activity does not seem to matter. The latter finding may be 
explained by the magnitude of the effect of the CT-instruction itself, the nature of the 
practice tasks (i.e., heuristics-and-biases tasks), and/or the setting of the experiments. 
Furthermore, findings suggest that these instructions and practice opportunities may 
also enhance near transfer, but are not sufficient to establish further transfer. As such, it 
can be suggested that bringing about far transfer needs longer or more extensive 
practice, in which obstacles such as suboptimal recall and application should be 
countered. 
Methodological issues 
Several methodological issues need to be discussed. Again, I will focus on the 
overarching issues as study specific issues have been addressed in each chapter. First, 
the measures in Chapters 2 to 4 showed low levels of reliability. Reliability issues are 
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quite common in research using tests consisting of heuristics-and-biases tasks (Aczel 
et al., 2015b; Bruine de Bruin, 2007; Janssen et al., 2019a; West et al., 2008) and multiple 
studies revealed concerns with the reliability of widely used standardized CT tests, 
particularly with regard to subscales (Bernard et al., 2008; Bondy et al., 2001; Janssen 
et al., 2020; Ku, 2009; Liu et al., 2014; Leppa, 1997; Loo & Thorpe, 1999; Rear, 2019). 
Low levels of reliability decrease statistical power and, thereby, reduce the chance of 
detecting true effects (e.g., Cleary et al., 1970; Rogers & Hopkins, 1988). Furthermore, 
given that the point estimates of the crucial interaction effects appeared to be very small, 
these may have been difficult to detect. 
 
In this dissertation, the low levels of reliability can probably be explained in terms of 
multidimensionality of the tests encompassing several heuristics-and-biases tasks, a 
factor often ignored in current research. That is, when tests represent multiple constructs 
that do not correlate with each other. As alluded to earlier, performance on such tasks 
depends not only on the extent to which that task elicits a bias (resulting from heuristic 
reasoning), but also on the extent to which one possesses the requisite mindware. Thus, 
systematic variance in performance on such tasks can either be explained by a person’s 
use of heuristics or his/her available mindware. If it differs per item to what extent a 
correct answer depends on these two aspects, there may not be a common factor 
explaining all interrelationships between the measured items. In that case, the theoretical 
assumption of unidimensionality is violated. 
 
In the research presented in this dissertation, the general reliability issue may have 
increased even more since multiple task types were included in the CT-skills tests, 
requiring different types of mindware (e.g., rules of logic or probability). Hence, I have 
attempted to increase reliability of the measures in Chapters 5 and 6, by constructing 
tests with multiple items of one task category to narrow down the tests into single 
measurable constructs and, thereby, to decrease measurement error (LeBel & 
Paunonen, 2011). Indeed, these compositions led to quite reliable measures. However, 
even though biased reasoning is a very important aspect of CT, it is already a rather 
restricted operationalization and this focus on one task category narrowed it even further. 
To achieve further progress in research on instructional methods for teaching CT, more 
knowledge on the construct validity of CT in general and unbiased reasoning is needed, 
and reliable (aspect-specific) tests of CT should be developed. That seems challenging, 
however, especially given that for practical use in educational contexts, tests cannot be 
overly long. 
 
Along with the issues raised, it should be considered to what extent the tests in the 
research reported in this dissertation and previous research by others, accurately 
assessed CT as it is practised in the real world, that is, outside education. I would argue 
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that the current findings do provide valuable insights into how people reason, given that 
heuristics-and-biases tasks represent how people judge under uncertainty and in 
various contexts; heuristics and biases appear in newspapers, books, courses, and 
applications of many kinds. Especially since in this dissertation – contrary to 
standardized CT-tests and most research on heuristics-and-biases tasks – CT was 
assessed at the level of individual study domains (i.e., content of the tasks was adapted 
to specific study domains) and could, therefore, be evaluated within authentic contexts. 
To illustrate, in Chapter 6, students’ ability to evaluate the logical validity of arguments in 
a written news item or article on a topic that they might encounter in their working life, 
was assessed. Hence, performance on these tasks could presumably predict everyday 
reasoning, as has already been assumed in various studies (see for example, Gilovich 
et al., 2002). 
 
A strength of the research presented in this dissertation, is that it follows the standards 
of an open research culture by using open practices. Open practices are designed to 
make scientific processes and results more transparent and accessible to others than 
the researchers involved (e.g., Nosek et al., 2015). It includes making complete research 
materials, designs, and data freely available to anyone, which makes it easier to replicate 
and evaluate scientific findings (for instance because both null results and statistically 
significant results are accessible). Although transparency and openness are readily 
recognized as disciplinary norms and values, scientific practice often fails to adhere 
these valued features (Ioannidis et al., 2014; John et al., 2012; Open Science 
Collaboration, 2012). Practicing open science has been central to the research reported 
in this dissertation. The study presented in Chapter 2 has already been published open 
access14 and, for all studies, important aspects of the research design and data analyses 
are publicly available on the online repository ‘Open Science Framework’ (OSF). 
 
Furthermore, this dissertation is strengthened by the fact that some of the studies have 
been preregistered on the OSF repository (Chapters 5 and 6), with specific details such 
as the hypotheses, planned analyses, and rules for data exclusions recorded prior to the 
data-analyses. The practice of pre-registration was introduced in response to some 
serious issues in academic publishing. These included, for instance, the use of 
‘questionable research practices’ by individual researchers, such as manipulating 
statistics to obtain significant effects (p-hacking) and hypothesizing after the results are 
known (HARKing; John et al., 2012; Simmons et al., 2011). Both open practices and pre-
registrations help to more accurately assess the evidence base for phenomena and are, 
therefore, imperative to increase confidence in scientific findings. 
                                               
14 In time, the studies presented in the other chapters will be publicly available as well, through publications in open 
access journals or preprints on the OSF-repository. 
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Implications for practice and future directions 
Educational practice and future research could benefit from the findings presented in 
this dissertation both from a theoretical and practical point of view. The findings clearly 
indicate that providing students with explicit CT-instruction and the opportunity to 
practice with domain-relevant problems has the potential to improve learning. It is 
important to emphasize, however, that there is no one-size-fits-all recommendation in 
terms of best practice activity. These acquired insights advocate for CT integration in 
higher education curricula and explicit CT objectives at course level (i.e., CT as 
important learning outcome), for instance through explicit CT-courses. Acquisition of 
requisite mindware was particularly central to this dissertation, but perhaps instructional 
designs should pay more attention to changing students’ thinking dispositions. To 
illustrate, a student who masters CT-skills but is unwilling to put in the mental effort to 
use these skills on complex or novel CT-tasks, will be no better off than a student without 
these CT-skills. Investigating the exact role of students’ thinking dispositions in fostering 
unbiased reasoning and developing an approach aimed at improving both aspects will 
be a fruitful area for further work. Enhancing thinking dispositions may require building 
a certain culture of thinking in the classroom, in which students are exposed to models 
of thinking of fellow students, supported in cultural interaction, and provided with direct 
instructions on thinking dispositions (cf. enculturation model; Tishman et al., 1993). Also, 
future research could explore whether changes as complex as these may be realized 
through personalized approaches, such as personalized feedback (Marsh & Eliseev, 
2019). It is important, then, to ensure that students believe in and process that feedback 
(Rich et al., 2017), which, however, is often left to the discretion of students. 
 
To specifically address development of deep learning of CT-skills, instructional design 
studies as in this dissertation could be preceded by research that identifies the exact 
factors that help or hinder learning of that explicit CT-skill. Chapter 6 is a useful example 
of how to design such a study. This chapter provided initial insights into the obstacles 
that prevent successful transfer of overturning belief-biased responses when evaluating 
the logical validity of arguments; students seem to have most difficulty with recall of the 
acquired knowledge and application of that knowledge onto novel tasks. Future studies 
should therefore focus on the recall and application/mapping steps in the transfer 
process. However, it could not be determined from this study why students have 
difficulties with these steps in the transfer process, which should be addressed in future 
investigations. Furthermore, the question of how to facilitate transfer of CT-skills remains 
of interest. Assuming that unsuccessful transfer of CT-skills can be attributed to recall 
and application/mapping problems, the challenge for researchers and educational 
practitioners (e.g., consultants, teachers) in the CT-domain is to develop instructional 
Chapter 7 
172 
designs that focus on these steps in the transfer process. A possible direction could be 
to provide exemplars of knowledge application while gradually remove scaffolding (cf. 
four-component instructional design model; Van Merriënboer et al., 1992) or while fading 
from concrete-to-abstract situations (i.e., concreteness fading; McNeil & Fyfe, 2012). 
 
More broadly, a key challenge of classroom studies is to prevent noisy or incomplete 
data produced by these realistic settings (e.g., Hulleman & Cordray, 2009), which would 
make it more difficult to detect any (small) effect. Issues as these can be (at least 
partially) addressed by using large sample sizes and collecting multiple data points per 
participant. Moreover, to increase the impact, transfer, and translation of education 
research into improved practice, it seems promising to additionally conduct instructional 
design research within even more realistic settings than in this dissertation (e.g., through 
education design research; McKenney & Reeves, 2018). Education design research 
blends empirical investigation with systematic development and implementation of 
solutions, such as improved instructional designs, for educational problems. To establish 
transfer of CT-skills, a longer, but carefully structured, intervention based on principles 
derived from prior fundamental research may be needed. A comprehensive CT-course 
(that fosters the cultivation of both CT-skills and thinking dispositions) can possibly meet 
these needs, which takes long-term studies in realistic settings to test its effectiveness.  
 
All of this assumes, of course, that those who teach CT are equipped with the knowledge 
and skills needed to effectively teach unbiased reasoning (e.g., Elen et al., 2019; 
Klassen & Tze, 2014). The challenge is for educators to know what is needed, and when. 
Furthermore, for educators to teach CT, they need to consider teaching CT as relevant 
(e.g., Eccles & Wigfield, 2002; Elen et al., 2009) and should have confidence in their 
ability to teach CT (Janssen et al., 2019b). To achieve this ambitious goal, we can 
facilitate educators by including (teaching/explaining) CT in professional development 
programs (e.g., Janssen et al., 2019a) and sharing CT resources that they could use in 
their own courses (e.g., Dutch online platform Kritisch Leren Denken: 
https://kritischdenkenhbo.nl/). 
Conclusion 
This dissertation sheds light on fostering higher education students’ learning and transfer 
of CT-skills, focusing specifically on avoiding bias in reasoning. The evidence presented 
highlights the importance of explicit CT-instruction and practice opportunities for 
learning of these skills. It also demonstrated that generative processing is not a panacea 
for all kinds of learning tasks: it does not seem to improve learning and transfer of CT-
Summary and general discussion 
173 
skills required for unbiased reasoning. This dissertation again underlines the great 
difficulty encountered when seeking to enhance CT-skills in such a way that these would 
also transfer across tasks/domains. All things considered, to help students become 
good critical thinkers in the sense they can apply the acquired skills to a variety of tasks 
and contexts, it seems valuable to develop longer CT interventions or comprehensive 
CT courses. To conclude, I believe further progress in this area will come from instruction 
designs that are grounded in solid laboratory and classroom studies. 
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Elke dag nemen we allerlei beslissingen en vellen we oordelen. Wanneer je de trein in 
stapt, maak je bijvoorbeeld een besluit waar je gaat zitten. En hoor je in die trein iemand 
veelvoudig niezen, dan ga je er momenteel al snel van uit dat diegene een virus 
opgelopen heeft. Doordat we vaak beperkt zijn in de tijd en in de hoeveelheid informatie 
die we tot onze beschikking hebben, maken we in ons denken gebruik van heuristieken 
(ofwel vuistregels). Heuristieken helpen ons om de grote hoeveelheid informatie die we 
dagelijks tegenkomen aan te kunnen en om redeneerprocessen te vereenvoudigen. 
Daardoor kunnen we relatief snel beslissingen nemen, vaak zonder dat we ons er bewust 
van zijn. Maar heuristieken maken ons ook vatbaar voor systematische redeneerfouten, 
die ook wel biases worden genoemd (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Wanneer men 
bijvoorbeeld gevraagd wordt om in te schatten of het waarschijnlijker is dat iemand 
overlijdt aan het coronavirus of dat iemand overlijdt aan het coronavirus én ouder is dan 
70 jaar, dan zal de intuïtieve reactie van de meeste mensen zijn dat de tweede optie 
waarschijnlijker is. Doordat de relatie tussen overlijden aan het coronavirus en het 
hebben van een hogere leeftijd vaak genoemd wordt en dus herkenbaar is, hebben we 
de neiging om de kans op deze combinatie te overschatten: we maken in dit geval 
gebruik van de representativiteitsheuristiek (Tverksy & Kahneman, 1983). De kans dat 
een bepaalde combinatie van gebeurtenissen voorkomt is echter áltijd kleiner dan de 
kans dat slechts een van deze gebeurtenissen voorkomt. Het is dus waarschijnlijker dat 
iemand overlijdt aan het coronavirus, dan dat diegene ook nog ouder is dan 70 jaar. In 
dit geval leidt het gebruik van een heuristiek dus tot een systematische redeneerfout. 
 
Het gebruik van heuristieken kan leiden tot redeneerfouten met ernstige gevolgen. Zeker 
in de complexe beroepssituaties waarin de meeste afgestudeerden in het hoger 
onderwijs terecht komen, zoals in de medische, economische of juridische sector. Denk 
bijvoorbeeld aan het verkeerd toedienen van medicatie, het geven van onjuist financieel 
advies of het onterecht veroordelen van een verdachte voor een strafbaar feit. Het 
tegengaan van systematische redeneerfouten vereist dat een intuïtieve reactie wordt 
onderdrukt en wordt vervangen door een rationele reactie, die gebaseerd is op 
redeneerregels of -strategieën (uit de logica en waarschijnlijkheidstheorie; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1972, 1973; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Ofwel, dat je kritisch kunt denken. 
Kritisch denken betekent, kort gezegd, dat je “redeneert en reflecteert voordat je een 
standpunt inneemt of een besluit neemt hoe te handelen en dat je kunt verklaren waarop 
dat standpunt of het besluit is gebaseerd”15. Het is dus van belang dat studenten in het 
hoger onderwijs worden opgeleid tot kritisch denkende professionals (Davies, 2013; 
                                               
15 Deze werkdefinitie is gebaseerd op de toonaangevende definitie van kritisch denken voor onderwijs en 
onderzoek, die is opgesteld door een panel van deskundigen: “kritisch denken wordt beschouwd als het vermogen 
om doelgericht, zelfregulerend te oordelen, resulterend in interpretatie, analyse, evaluatie en gevolgtrekking, alsook 
het verklaren waarop dat oordeel is gebaseerd in termen van bewijzen, concepten, methodes, criteria en 
contextuele overwegingen” (APA: Facione, 1990, p.2). 
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Facione, 1990; Halpern, 2014; Van Gelder, 2005). Een belangrijk kenmerk van een 
kritisch denkende professional is dat hij/zij in staat is om onbevooroordeeld te redeneren 
en beslissingen te nemen, zonder systematische redeneerfouten te maken. Er bestaan 
echter tal van systematische redeneerfouten en het is niet haalbaar om studenten te 
trainen in het vermijden van elk type redeneerfout. Daarom is het de uitdaging 
leeractiviteiten zó te ontwerpen dat de kritisch-denken-vaardigheden van studenten niet 
alleen verbeteren op de getrainde redeneertaken in een gegeven context, maar dat de 
geleerde vaardigheden ook tot verbetering leiden op andersoortige redeneertaken of tot 
een verbetering van de getrainde redeneertaken in een andere context. Met andere 
woorden, het doel van kritisch-denken-instructie is onder meer dat er transfer optreedt 
van de geleerde vaardigheden naar nieuwe taken en situaties. De vraag die in dit 
proefschrift centraal stond, was dan ook hoe kritisch-denken-instructie het beste kan 
worden vormgegeven om ervoor te zorgen dat studenten in het hoger onderwijs (1) leren 
om systematische redeneerfouten te vermijden en (2) het geleerde kunnen toepassen 
op nieuwe redeneertaken en in nieuwe situaties (transfer). 
 
Om nieuwe leerstof langere tijd te onthouden en te kunnen toepassen in nieuwe situaties, 
moet de leerstof actief verwerkt worden. Zogenoemde ‘generatieve 
verwerkingsstrategieën’ (Engels: generative processing strategies) kunnen hieraan 
bijdragen: ze vereisen van studenten dat zij extra inspanningen leveren tijdens het leren 
(bijvoorbeeld door het genereren van verklaringen of vergelijkingen) en zorgen ervoor 
dat betekenis wordt gegeven aan de leerstof. Generatieve verwerking helpt om 
informatie in het geheugen te organiseren in samenhangende kennisstructuren en te 
integreren met reeds aanwezige kennis (Grabowski, 1996; Osborne & Wittrock, 1983; 
Wittrock, 1974, 1990, 1992, 2010). Bovendien kan het studenten helpen om de 
onderliggende principes van een probleem te identificeren en te leren welke 
oplossingsprocedure voor dit type probleem nodig is. Als een nieuw probleem 
vervolgens hetzelfde onderliggende principe heeft en de student herkent dit, dan kan 
hij/zij de aangeleerde procedure gebruiken om het nieuwe probleem op te lossen. Er 
treedt dan transfer op. Generatieve verwerkingsstrategieën zijn effectief gebleken voor 
het leren en de transfer van diverse vaardigheden (zie bijv. Fiorella & Mayer, 2016; 
Wittrock, 2010), maar het was nog onduidelijk of ze ook helpen bij het leren om 
systematische redeneerfouten te vermijden. In de studies in hoofdstuk 2 tot en met 5 
werd daarom onderzocht of generatieve verwerkingsstrategieën eveneens het leren en 
de transfer van kritisch-denken-vaardigheden verder verbeteren (bovenop de effecten 
van instructie en oefening). In de studie in hoofdstuk 6 is daarnaast onderzocht welke 
factoren succesvolle transfer van kritisch-denken-vaardigheden belemmeren. 
 
De generatieve verwerkingsstrategieën die in dit proefschrift zijn onderzocht, waren: 
studenten aansporen om aan zichzelf hun redeneerproces uit te leggen tijdens het 
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oefenen, ook wel ‘zelfverklaren’ genoemd (hoofdstuk 2); variatie aanbrengen in 
taaktypen tijdens oefening, waarmee vergelijkingen tussen taken maken (impliciet) wordt 
aangemoedigd (hoofdstuk 3); studenten stimuleren om correcte en incorrecte 
‘uitgewerkte voorbeelden’ te vergelijken (hoofdstuk 4); en op meerdere momenten 
oefentaken aanbieden aan studenten, zodat zij die informatie herhaaldelijk uit hun 
geheugen moeten ophalen (hoofdstuk 5). De effecten van deze strategieën, ofwel 
interventies, werden getest in experimenten die plaatsvonden in de praktijk van het 
hoger onderwijs. Zo werd in de studie in hoofdstuk 2 één groep studenten aangezet tot 
zelfverklaren. In elke studie was er minstens één controlegroep, die een andere of geen 
interventie kreeg. Eerst werd bij alle groepen een voormeting (pretest) afgenomen. 
Vervolgens kregen ze instructies over kritisch denken (het belang en de kenmerken van 
kritisch denken en de vaardigheden en houding die nodig zijn om kritisch te denken) en 
over specifieke heuristics-and-biases taken, vergelijkbaar met het 
‘coronavirusvoorbeeld’ aan het begin van dit hoofdstuk. Daarna werd er geoefend, al 
dan niet met extra interventie. Direct na het oefenen werd er een nameting (posttest) 
afgenomen. In elk hoofdstuk werd dus op tenminste twee momenten de mate van 
onbevooroordeeld redeneren en de mentale inspanning gemeten (pretest en posttest). 
Onbevooroordeeld redeneren werd in kaart gebracht door prestatie op heuristics-and-
biases taken van de test te bepalen, zowel voor taakcategorieën die deel uitmaakten 
van de oefenfase (hiermee werd het leren gemeten) als voor nieuwe taakcategorieën 
met dezelfde onderliggende principes (hiermee werd transfer gemeten). In hoofdstuk 2 
en 4 werden studenten tevens op een later moment, tussen de twee weken en negen 
maanden, getest (verlate posttest). 
De hoofdbevindingen 
In hoofdstuk 2 werd onderzocht of het aanzetten van studenten tot zelfverklaren, ofwel 
het aan zichzelf uitleggen van hun redeneerproces (Bisra et al., 2018; Chi, 2000; Fiorella 
& Mayer, 2016) tijdens het oefenen, effectief zou zijn voor het leren en de transfer van 
de vaardigheid om systematische redeneerfouten te vermijden. De studie werd 
uitgevoerd in de context van een hbo-vak. De studenten ontvingen eerst de instructies 
over kritisch denken. Vervolgens oefenden ze met een aantal taken in de context van 
domeinrelevante problemen. Dat wil zeggen dat de taken realistische problemen 
bevatten uit het studiedomein van de studenten, in dit geval Integrale Veiligheidskunde. 
Tijdens het oefenen werd de helft van de studenten gevraagd om zelfverklaringen te 
genereren. Uit de resultaten bleek dat de prestaties van studenten op de leertaken 
verbeterden van pretest naar posttest en dat dit prestatieniveau na twee weken nog even 
hoog was. Dat wil zeggen dat studenten na de instructie en het oefenen beter in staat 
waren om systematische redeneerfouten te vermijden op de leertaken. Er was echter 
geen verschil in prestaties op de leer- en transfertaken tussen de groep die werd 
aangezet tot het genereren van zelfverklaringen en de controlegroep die niet werd 
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aangezet tot zelfverklaren. Bovendien was het opmerkelijk dat de mentale inspanning 
die studenten leverden tijdens het maken van de taken niet verschilde tussen de twee 
groepen. Mogelijk hebben de studenten in de controlegroep ook generatieve 
verwerkingsprocessen gebruikt, bijvoorbeeld door spontaan zelfverklaringen te 
genereren. In dit hoofdstuk is daarnaast onderzocht of de kwaliteit van de 
zelfverklaringen van de studenten gerelateerd was aan hun prestaties op de leer- en 
transfertaken. Dit was inderdaad het geval: de studenten die verklaringen van hogere 
kwaliteit gaven, presteerden ook beter op de leertaken op de posttest (maar niet op de 
transfertaken). Eenvoudiger gezegd, de studenten die beter waren in het aan zichzelf 
uitleggen van hun redeneerproces, presteerden ook beter. Deze correlatie duidt wellicht 
op een causaal verband: door aan zichzelf hun eigen redeneerproces uit te leggen, 
gaan studenten beter presteren. Het kan echter ook zo zijn dat studenten met een hoger 
algemeen kennis- of vaardigheidsniveau betere zelfverklaringen genereren en beter 
presteren dan mensen met een lager kennisniveau. 
 
In hoofdstuk 3 werd onderzocht of het creëren van variatie in oefening effectief zou zijn 
voor het bevorderen van leren en transfer. Er werden twee experimenten uitgevoerd; een 
met universitaire studenten in het laboratorium en een met hbo-studenten in de context 
van een vak. De variatie in oefening werd gecreëerd door de oefentaken af te wisselen 
die betrekking hadden op verschillende redeneerfouten (Engels: interleaved practice; 
bijv. Barreiros et al., 2007; Helsdingen et al., 2011; Rau et al., 2013) in plaats van de 
oefentaken gegroepeerd per redeneerfout aan te bieden (Engels: blocked practice). Bij 
een gevarieerd oefenschema werden de verschillende type oefentaken dus afgewisseld 
– ABACBCAABC – terwijl bij een gegroepeerd oefenschema blokken met dezelfde type 
oefentaken werden aangeboden – AAA-BBB-CCC. Afwisseling in taaktypen is belangrijk 
om studenten te leren verschillende oplossingsprocedures te gebruiken: bij elke taak 
moet immers het type probleem en een passende oplossing herkend worden. Hoewel 
dit bijdraagt aan betere prestaties op de langere termijn (bijv. Helsdingen et al., 2011a, 
2011b), doet het een groter beroep op het werkgeheugen dan oefenen in een 
gegroepeerd schema. Omdat een te hoge werkgeheugenbelasting het leren kan 
belemmeren (Paas et al., 2003a), is tevens onderzocht of studenten meer zouden 
profiteren van afwisseling in taaktypen, wanneer ze uitgewerkte voorbeelden 
bestudeerden in plaats van dat ze oefenproblemen oplosten (vgl. Paas & Van 
Merriënboer, 1994). Het bestuderen van uitgewerkte voorbeelden – dit zijn oefeningen 
waarvan de oplossing volledig is uitgeschreven – leidt namelijk tot een lagere belasting 
van het werkgeheugen, terwijl de leerprestaties gelijk blijven of zelfs verbeteren (Van 
Gog et al., 2019). Nadat de studenten de instructie over kritisch denken ontvingen, 
volgden zij of (1) een gevarieerd oefenschema met uitgewerkte voorbeelden, of (2) een 
gevarieerd oefenschema met probleem-oplostaken, of (3) een gegroepeerd 
oefenschema met uitgewerkte voorbeelden of (4) een gegroepeerd oefenschema met 
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probleem-oplostaken. In beide experimenten verbeterden de prestaties op de leertaken 
opnieuw na de instructie en het oefenen. Er waren echter geen aanwijzingen dat een 
gevarieerd oefenschema tot betere prestaties leidde op de leer- of transfertaken dan 
een gegroepeerd oefenschema, ongeacht of er geoefend werd met uitgewerkte 
voorbeelden of probleem-oplostaken. Een interessante bevinding uit het experiment met 
de universitaire studenten was dat het bestuderen van uitgewerkte voorbeelden tot 
betere prestaties op de leertaken leidde dan het oplossen van oefenproblemen. 
Bovendien werden deze prestaties bereikt met minder mentale inspanning tijdens de 
tests; dat wil zeggen dat de uitgewerkte voorbeelden zowel effectiever als efficiënter 
waren (Hoffman & Schraw, 2010; Paas & Van Merriënboer, 1993; Van Gog & Paas, 
2008). Het tweede experiment met de hbo-studenten repliceerde dit positieve effect van 
uitgewerkte voorbeelden maar alleen bij beginners (studenten die nog weinig of geen 
voorkennis hadden) en niet bij meer gevorderden. Deze experimenten toonden daarmee 
voor het eerst aan dat het effect van uitgewerkte voorbeelden ook van toepassing is op 
het trainen van kritisch-denken-vaardigheden van beginners. De bevinding uit het 
tweede experiment is bovendien in lijn met het expertise reversal effect (bijv. Kalyuga et 
al., 2003, 2012), dat stelt dat instructiestrategieën die studenten helpen bij het 
ontwikkelen van cognitieve schema’s effectief zijn wanneer studenten hun eerste 
stappen zetten in het verwerven van nieuwe kennis of vaardigheden, maar vaak niet als 
zij al meer gevorderd zijn. 
 
In hoofdstuk 4 stond het vergelijken van correcte en incorrecte uitgewerkte voorbeelden 
(ook wel contrasterende voorbeelden genoemd) centraal. Er werd onderzocht of (1) het 
bestuderen van contrasterende voorbeelden zou zorgen voor een grotere verbetering in 
de vaardigheid om systematische redeneerfouten te vermijden dan (2) het alleen 
bestuderen van correcte voorbeelden, of (3) het alleen bestuderen van incorrecte 
voorbeelden of (4) het oplossen van oefenproblemen. De studie werd wederom 
uitgevoerd in de context van een hbo-vak. De studenten ontvingen eerst de instructies 
over kritisch denken. Daarna oefenden ze met een aantal taken in de context van 
domeinrelevante problemen, onder een van de vier bovengenoemde oefencondities. Uit 
de resultaten bleek dat de prestaties van de studenten op de leertaken wederom 
verbeterden na de instructie en het oefenen. Bovendien presteerden de studenten zelfs 
nog beter na drie weken. Er waren echter geen verschillen tussen de vier oefengroepen 
in prestaties op de leer-en transfertaken. Bovendien waren er in deze studie geen 
aanwijzingen dat het bestuderen van uitgewerkte voorbeelden tot betere prestaties 
leidde dan het oplossen van oefenproblemen. Dit in tegenstelling tot de bevinding uit 
hoofdstuk 3 en de bevindingen uit eerdere studies met vele andere soorten taken (bijv. 
Renkl, 2014; Van Gog et al., 2019). 
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De studie in hoofdstuk 5 onderzocht of het herhaaldelijk ophalen van informatie uit het 
geheugen (Engels: repeated retrieval practice) effectief zou zijn voor het leren vermijden 
van systematische redeneerfouten en of dit bijdraagt aan transfer. Meer specifiek, 
kregen studenten de mogelijkheid om te oefenen in meerdere sessies die verspreid 
waren over een periode van een aantal weken. Deze studie werd wederom uitgevoerd 
in de context van een hbo-vak. De studenten ontvingen eerst de instructies over kritisch 
denken. Daarna oefenden zij met een aantal taken in de context van domeinrelevante 
problemen. Na elke oefening werd getoond of het gegeven antwoord juist was en kregen 
de studenten een uitgewerkt voorbeeld van een goede redenering te zien (feedback). 
Afhankelijk van de groep waarin de studenten ingedeeld waren, oefenden ze eenmalig, 
oefenden ze een tweede keer (een week later) of oefenden ze een derde keer (twee 
weken na de tweede keer). Een verrassende bevinding was dat (herhaald) oefenen geen 
significant effect had op de prestatie op de leertaken: de drie groepen lieten geen 
vooruitgang zien na de instructie en het oefenen. Tenminste, dit was het geval wanneer 
de prestatie werd gemeten aan de hand van zowel de antwoorden op meerkeuzevragen 
als de onderbouwing van deze antwoorden. Wanneer alleen naar de antwoorden op de 
meerkeuzevragen werd gekeken, werd er wel bij alle drie de groepen een vooruitgang 
in prestatie op de leertaken gevonden. Bovendien bleek, zoals werd verwacht op basis 
van bevindingen uit eerder onderzoek (bijv. Butler, 2010; McDaniel et al., 2012, 2013; 
Roediger & Butler, 2011), dat de gemiddelde prestatie tijdens het oefenen verbeterde 
naarmate er meer geoefend werd. Het lijkt er dus op dat de studenten wel enigszins 
profiteerden van herhaald oefenen, maar dat zij niet in staat waren om hun antwoorden 
goed te onderbouwen. Helaas kon het effect op transfer niet worden vastgesteld omdat 
de prestatie van studenten op de transfertaken extreem laag was (Engels: floor effect). 
Mogelijk heeft de feedback het effect van herhaald oefenen op leren tenietgedaan. 
Volgens recent onderzoek is feedback alleen nuttig wanneer studenten niet in staat zijn 
om tot het goede antwoord te komen en heeft het nauwelijks invloed wanneer zij hier wel 
toe in staat zijn (Kliegl et al., 2019; Pastötter & Bäuml, 2016; Storm et al., 2014). Het is 
dus mogelijk dat de groep studenten die maar één keer oefende – en het minst goed 
presteerde tijdens het oefenen – de feedback beter heeft verwerkt en daardoor even 
goed presteerde op de posttest als de andere groepen. Dit idee wordt ondersteund door 
de bevinding dat de studenten meer tijd besteedden aan de feedback na onjuiste 
antwoorden op de oefentaken dan na juiste antwoorden. 
 
De studie in hoofdstuk 6 richtte zich op het identificeren van belemmeringen voor 
succesvolle transfer van vaardigheden om kritisch te denken. Wanneer transfer niet 
succesvol is, dan zou dit kunnen komen doordat studenten niet herkennen dat de 
aangeleerde kennis relevant is voor het nieuwe probleem, doordat ze de aangeleerde 
kennis niet uit hun geheugen kunnen ophalen of doordat ze de aangeleerde kennis niet 
kunnen toepassen op het nieuwe probleem (het driestappenmodel van transfer; Barnett 
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& Ceci, 2012). Er werden twee experimenten uitgevoerd om vast te stellen waar het 
transferprobleem uit eerdere onderzoeken van dit proefschrift door veroorzaakt zou 
kunnen zijn: één experiment met universitaire studenten in het laboratorium en één met 
hbo-studenten in de context van een vak. De studenten ontvingen eerst instructies over 
kritisch denken. Daarna oefenden zij met syllogismen – dit zijn redeneertaken waarbij je 
moet bepalen of een getrokken conclusie geldig is – in de context van domeinrelevante 
problemen. Deze keer werd de prestatie van de studenten gemeten op syllogismen 
(hiermee werd het leren gemeten), syllogismen in nieuwsberichten of artikelen (hiermee 
werd nabije transfer gemeten) en nieuwe taken met dezelfde onderliggende principes 
als syllogismen (hiermee werd verre transfer gemeten). De studenten werden ingedeeld 
in vier verschillende groepen en afhankelijk van de groep, ontvingen zij tijdens het 
maken van de transfertaken op de posttest (1) geen ondersteuning, (2) hints dat de 
principes uit de instructie relevant waren voor deze taken (ondersteuning in herkenning), 
(3) hints dat de principes uit de instructie relevant waren voor deze taken en de vraag 
om de opgedane kennis over die principes op te halen uit het geheugen (kennis 
ophalen) of (4) hints dat de principes uit de instructie relevant waren voor deze taken en 
een kort overzicht op papier van deze principes (ondersteuning in ophalen). Kortom, er 
werd in de condities verschillende ondersteuning voor de verschillende stappen in het 
transferproces aangeboden. Door de effecten van de condities te vergelijken, valt dan 
af te leiden waar zich problemen in het bereiken van transfer voordoen bij de studenten 
(vlg. Butler et al., 2013, 2017). Binnen de ‘kennis ophalen’ groep werd daarnaast 
gekeken of het vermogen van de studenten om kennis op te halen uit het geheugen 
gerelateerd was aan hun prestaties op de transfertaken. In beide experimenten 
verbeterden de prestaties van studenten op de leer- en nabije transfertaken na de 
instructie en het oefenen. Er werd zelfs een verbetering op de verre-transfertaken 
gevonden, maar de prestatie op deze taken was over het algemeen vrij laag dus er was 
nog veel ruimte voor verbetering. Een interessante bevinding was dat er geen verschillen 
waren tussen de vier groepen. De studenten waren dus niet geholpen bij de 
ondersteuning voor herkenning en ophalen. Dit suggereert dat de studenten in staat 
waren te herkennen dat de aangeleerde kennis relevant was voor de nieuwe taken en 
dat zij deze kennis konden ophalen uit het geheugen, maar moeite hadden met het 
toepassen van deze kennis op de nieuwe taken. Echter, de bevindingen uit de ‘kennis 
ophalen’ groep ondersteunen het idee dat de studenten alleen problemen hadden met 
het toepassen van de aangeleerde kennis niet volledig. De meeste studenten haalden 
namelijk niet alle relevante informatie op uit het geheugen. Bovendien werd er (via 
verkennende analyses) een matig tot hoog positief verband gevonden tussen de 
opgehaalde kennis en de prestaties op de transfertaken. Dit wijst erop dat problemen in 
het ophalen van kennis in elk geval ten dele ook een rol spelen bij niet-succesvolle 
transfer. Beschrijvende statistieken ondersteunen dit idee: de studenten die 
ondersteuning in ophalen kregen, presteerden beter (hoewel niet significant beter) dan 
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de studenten in de andere groepen op de verre-transfertaken van de posttest in het 
eerste experiment en op de nabije-transfertaken in het tweede experiment. 
Conclusie 
Dit proefschrift werpt meer licht op de complexiteit van het bevorderen van het leren en 
de transfer van kritisch-denken-vaardigheden van studenten in het hoger onderwijs. De 
bevindingen in dit proefschrift benadrukken het belang van expliciete instructie over 
kritisch denken in combinatie met oefening op domeinrelevante problemen voor het 
leren van kritisch-denken-vaardigheden. Het lijkt dus waardevol om kritisch denken in te 
bedden in hoger onderwijs curricula en het expliciet aan bod te laten komen in (kritisch 
denken) vakken. Tevens werd uit dit proefschrift duidelijk dat generatieve 
verwerkingsstrategieën geen wondermiddel zijn om leren te verbeteren en transfer te 
bewerkstelligen. Hoewel ze voor sommige vaardigheden goed werken, lijken ze namelijk 
niet bij te dragen aan het verder bevorderen van de vaardigheid om systematische 
redeneerfouten te vermijden (bovenop de effecten van instructie en oefening). 
Daarnaast maken de studies in dit proefschrift eens te meer duidelijk hoe moeilijk het is 
om kritisch-denken-vaardigheden zodanig te trainen dat er ook transfer optreedt naar 
nieuwe situaties. Het lijkt zinvol om in (onderzoek naar) onderwijs in kritisch denken meer 
aandacht te besteden aan factoren die succesvolle transfer van kritisch-denken-
vaardigheden kunnen belemmeren, zoals problemen met het ophalen van aangeleerde 
kennis uit het geheugen en met het toepassen van deze kennis in een nieuwe context. 
Met het oog op dat laatste, zou het interessant zijn om verder te onderzoeken hoe 
studenten ondersteund kunnen worden in de toepassing van kritisch-denken-
vaardigheden.  
 
Om studenten te helpen goede kritische denkers te worden – in de zin dat zij 
aangeleerde vaardigheden kunnen toepassen op verschillende taken en in 
verschillende contexten – lijkt het waardevol om in toekomstig (praktijkgericht) 
onderzoek de effecten van langere interventies of uitgebreidere cursussen gericht op 
kritisch denken te onderzoeken. Daarnaast is het van belang om in toekomstig 
onderzoek ook aandacht te besteden aan de ontwikkeling en de verbetering van de 
denkhouding van studenten. Want interventies die de kritisch-denken-vaardigheden van 
studenten verbeteren, zullen in de praktijk weinig zoden aan de dijk zetten wanneer 
studenten niet de juiste denkhouding hebben en geen mentale inspanning willen leveren 
om deze vaardigheden te gebruiken. Kortom, de vraag is hoe we studenten uit kunnen 
dagen om in kritisch denken te investeren.
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Presentations 
Scientific presentations on the studies that have been conducted as part of this research 
project to educational professionals and researchers at (inter)national conferences and 
symposia. Presenting author(s) indicated with *. 
Van Peppen, L. M.*, Verkoeijen, P. P. L. J., Heijltjes, A. E. G., Janssen, E. M., & Van Gog, T. 
(2019, August). Contrasting correct and erroneous examples to enhance students’ critical 
thinking skills. Oral presentation as part of the symposium ‘Critical Thinking in Higher 
Education: Educational Guidelines and Instructional Interventions’ (Organizers: L.M. van 
Peppen & E. M. Janssen) at the biannual conference of the European Association for 
Research on Learning and Instruction (EARLI 2019), Aachen, Germany. 
Van Peppen, L. M.*, Verkoeijen, P. P. L. J., Heijltjes, A. E. G., Janssen, E. M., & Van Gog, T. 
(2019, March). Enhancing students’ critical thinking skills: Is contrasting correct and 
erroneous examples beneficial? Pitch at the Graduate Research Day of the Department of 
Psychology Education and Child Studies (GRD DPECS) of the Erasmus University 
Rotterdam, Rotterdam, the Netherlands. 
Van Peppen, L. M.*, Verkoeijen, P. P. L. J., Heijltjes, A. E. G., Janssen, E. M., & Van Gog, T. 
(2018, August). Can contrasting correct and erroneous examples enhance students’ 
critical thinking skills? Poster presentation at the biannual conference of Special Interest 
Groups 6 and 7 (Instructional Design & Technology Enhanced Learning and Instruction) 
of the European Association for Research on Learning and Instruction (EARLI SIG 6-7 
2018), Bonn, Germany. 
 Awarded with (1) Best Poster Presentation Award, EARLI SIG 6–7 conference 2018 and 
(2) Award for PhD Excellence: Best Poster 2018, Erasmus Graduate School of Sciences 
and the Humanities. 
Van Peppen, L. M.*, Kolenbrander, S.V., Verkoeijen, P. P. L. J., Heijltjes, A. E. G., Janssen, E. 
M., & Van Gog, T. (2018, April). Learning to avoid biased reasoning: Effects of interleaved 
practice and worked examples. Oral presentation as part of the symposium ‘Teaching 
critical thinking: Assessing and improving students’ and teachers’ reasoning skills’ 
(Organizers: L.M. van Peppen & E. M. Janssen) at the annual conference of the American 
Educational Research Association (AERA 2018), New York, NY, USA. 
Curriculum vitae 
 214 
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Van Gog, T. (2016, Oktober). Effects of self-explaining on learning and transfer of critical 
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International Fall School (ICO IFS 2016), Bad Schussenried, Germany. 
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Workshops and training sessions on various educational and psychological topics to 
students, teachers, educational practitioners, and researchers. Presenting author(s) 
indicated with *. 
 
Van Peppen, L. M.*, & Janssen, E. M.*, (2019, November). “Van mening veranderen is een teken 
van zwakte”: Wat is een kritische denkhouding en (hoe) kun je die bevorderen? [“Changing 
your opinion is a sign of weakness”: What is a critical thinking attitude and (how) can you 
improve it?]. Workshop at the symposium ‘Laat je (niets) wijsmaken!’ over kritisch leren 
denken in het hbo [symposium on critical thinking in higher professional education], Avans 
Hogeschool, Den Bosch, the Netherlands. 
Raaijmakers, L. H.*, Van Peppen, L. M.*, Tillema, M.*, & Van Harsel, M. (2019, February). 
Motiverend lesgeven [Teaching motivating]. Workshop at the Academie voor Industrie en 
Informatica (AI&I) of Avans University of Applied Sciences, Den Bosch, the Netherlands. 
Van Peppen, L. M.* (2016 – 2019). Kritisch leren denken [Learning to think critically]. Numerous 
training sessions for students of Avans University of Applied Sciences and the Erasmus 
University Rotterdam in the context of research. 
Van Peppen, L. M.*, & Van Harsel, M.* (2018, November). Effectief leren en studeren: hoe doe 
je dat? [Learning and studying effectively: How to do that?]. Workshop at Beroepshavo 
MBO College Hilversum, the Netherlands. 
Janssen, E. M.*, & Van Peppen, L. M.* (2017, November). Kritisch denken doceren kun je leren?! 
[Teaching critical thinking can be learned?!]. Workshop during the expertmeeting ‘Werk 
maken van kritisch denken in het hbo’ of the Vereniging Hogescholen on critical thinking 
in higher professional education, Driebergen, the Netherlands. 
Heijltjes, A. E. G.*, Janssen, E. M.*, & Van Peppen, L. M.* (2016, Oktober). Kritisch denken loont 
de moeite [Critical thinking pays off]. Workshop at the symposium ‘Leren in het hbo: 
denken, doen en laten’, organized by the Brain and Learning research group of Avans 
University of Applied Sciences, Breda, the Netherlands.
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De zon schijnt de kamer in, op de achtergrond hoor ik Marcus Mumford zingen “I lift up 
my eyes to a new high”. In gedachten neem ik de afgelopen jaren door en ik besluit de 
allerlaatste hand aan mijn proefschrift te leggen. Het is er de tijd voor. De afgelopen 
jaren vormden een prachtig leerzame periode. Dankbaar ben ik eenieder die mij 
geholpen, aangemoedigd of gesteund heeft. Dankzij jullie was het voor mij mogelijk dit 
proefschrift te schrijven en me op persoonlijk vlak te ontwikkelen. In het bijzonder wil ik 
de volgende personen bedanken. 
 
Allereerst dr. Peter Verkoeijen, prof.dr. Tamara van Gog en dr. Anita Heijltjes voor de 
begeleiding tijdens mijn promotietraject. Het was een eer om jullie als mijn 
begeleidingsteam te hebben. 
 
Peter, jij hebt me op zoveel vlakken dingen geleerd. Wekelijks maakte je tijd om 
onder het genot van een kop koffie bij te praten over de dagelijkse gang van zaken 
en om inhoudelijk te discussiëren. Van ontwikkelingen binnen het onderwijs en 
vernieuwingen binnen de wetenschap tot het spel van NAC Breda en het ongemak 
bij Boer zoekt Vrouw. Jouw uiterst deskundige en altijd snelle commentaar, 
stimuleerde me om het onderste uit de kan te halen. Je gaf me vertrouwen en 
verschafte me de inzichten die ik nodig had om op eigen benen te gaan staan. Ik 
heb jouw wijze raad en interesse in mijn leven naast het onderzoek altijd zeer 
gewaardeerd. Dat we in de toekomst nog maar geregeld een kop koffie met elkaar 
mogen gaan drinken. 
 
Tamara, jij wist me met jouw scherpe blik uit te dagen mijn eigen werk kritisch te 
beschouwen. Jouw theoretisch denkvermogen en waardevolle inzichten hebben 
dit proefschrift naar een hoger niveau getild. Naast het begeleiden van mijn 
onderzoek was je ook altijd geïnteresseerd in mijn (carrière)ontwikkeling. Bedankt 
voor je oprechte betrokkenheid, het vertrouwen dat je in me had en de vele kansen 
die je me geboden hebt. 
 
Anita, het is grotendeels aan jouw inspanningen te danken dat dit proefschrift hier 
ligt. Met jouw promotieonderzoek en opgebouwde kennis over het onderwijzen van 
kritisch denken, heb je feitelijk het fundament gelegd. Al mijn stukken werden door 
jou grondig gelezen en van inspirerende suggesties voorzien. Ik heb veel 
bewondering voor de wijze waarop jij wetenschap naar praktijk weet te vertalen. 
Bedankt voor de integere en persoonlijke manier van begeleiden, het was een 
voorrecht om van jou te mogen leren.  
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De leden van de promotiecommissie, prof.dr. Fred Paas, prof.dr. Paul van den Broek en 
dr. Katinka Dijkstra dank ik voor het kritisch lezen en beoordelen van dit proefschrift en 
het deelnemen aan de oppositie. Tevens dank ik de overige leden van 
promotiecommissie, prof.dr. Jan Elen, prof.dr. Sofie Loyens en dr. Marion Tillema voor 
hun bereidheid om met mij van gedachten te wisselen over de inhoud van mijn 
proefschrift. 
 
Et al., het is de afkorting in het Latijn voor ‘en anderen’. In de wetenschap duidt het op 
degenen die een bijdrage hebben geleverd aan een product. Alleen al door de afkorting 
wordt de bijdrage van deze personen vaak onderschat. Dit proefschrift is veel meer dan 
een product van mij alleen. Het is tot stand gekomen dankzij de samenwerking en de 
steun van vele collega’s. Graag richt ik me hier dan ook tot deze ‘anderen’. 
 
Dankbaar ben ik dat ik onderdeel mocht zijn van het project ‘Investing in Thinking 
Pays Good Interest’. Een project waarbij kritisch denken en leren in de praktijk 
centraal staan, dat vraagt natuurlijk om eenzelfde houding van de betrokkenen. 
Anita, Eva, Peter, Tamara en Tim, bedankt voor al jullie waardevolle ideeën en 
kritische kanttekeningen, maar bovenal voor de fijne sfeer tijdens onze 
bijeenkomsten. Ondanks de bovengemiddelde affiniteit met de Duitse taal en 
menig grap die daardoor aan mij voorbij is gegaan, viel er met jullie heel wat te 
lachen. In het bijzonder wil ik mijn medepromovenda Eva bedanken, ik denk met 
een lach op mijn gezicht terug aan onze samenwerking, gesprekken, borrels en 
congresbezoeken. Met onze verschillende karakters wisten wij elkaar goed aan te 
vullen en ik hoop dat onze wegen zich in de toekomst nog veel vaker zullen kruisen. 
Dat de lijnen Rotterdam-Utrecht-Breda maar kort mogen blijven! 
 
Ook de vele collega’s van de Erasmus Universiteit bij wie ik terecht kon voor advies 
en momenten van ontspanning ben ik erkentelijk. Met name de collega’s uit de 
O&O-sectie en alle medepromovendi wil ik bedanken voor de collegiale sfeer en 
de gezellige lunchpauzes. Een aantal in het bijzonder, Donna, Eke, Gertjan, I\G, 
Jacqueline, Jason, Keri, Loïs, Marloes, Milou, Miranda, Sabrina en Willemijn, niets 
is zo fijn als samen in hetzelfde schuitje zitten. Ilse, bedankt voor de fijne 
gezamenlijke start en onze aangename momenten samen. Denise, Iris, Lara en 
Marieke, jullie oprechte interesse maakte dat ik me al snel thuis voelde en droeg 
eraan bij dat ik met plezier naar werk kwam. Anniek en Julia, het was fijn om de 
dag te starten met een (langer dan gepland) praatje in jullie kamer. Rob, bedankt 
dat je altijd tijd maakte voor een kop koffie en een portie droge humor. Ik hoop dat 
we die momenten erin blijven houden. Onvergetelijk was ook mijn kamergenoot 
Marijntje, ik ben dankbaar dat ik vier jaar naast jou heb mogen doorbrengen. 
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Alle collega’s van Avans Hogeschool en het lectoraat Brein & Leren wil ik bedanken 
voor de fijne donderdagen vol interessante discussies en gezelligheid. Anita, 
Anton, Eva, Hans, Ilse, Janneke, Lottie, Marion, Marloes, Michael, Milou, Peter, 
Stefan, Suzan en Yvonne, jullie passie voor het onderwijs is aanstekelijk en heeft 
ervoor gezorgd dat ik altijd oog voor de praktijk hield. In het bijzonder wil ik Stefan 
bedanken, ik was nog maar net gestart of jij had al een groep studenten paraat 
voor mijn onderzoek. Het was de start van een vruchtbare, maar bovenal 
ontzettend prettige samenwerking. Marion, ik heb bewondering voor de manier 
waarop jij wetenschap en praktijk weet samen te brengen en ben vereerd dat je in 
mijn promotiecommissie wilt plaatsnemen. Marloes, Milou en Suzan, bedankt voor 
de fijne gesprekken en wijze adviezen. Aan allen hierboven, houdoe en bedankt! 
 
I would like to sincerely thank prof.dr. Patricia Alexander for the opportunity to visit 
her lab at the University of Maryland. Patricia, it was a true honor working with you 
and learning as much as I did from you. Also, I would like to thank the other 
members of the ‘Alexander family’ for all the great conversations and discussions. 
Special thanks to Anisha, Eric, Julianne, and Yuting, for making me feel so welcome 
during my stay. Eric and Julianne, I very much enjoyed our days working in the sun 
(while drinking cappuccino vanilla) and our dinners. To all, hope we’ll meet again! 
 
Een woord van dank aan alle studenten die hebben deelgenomen aan het 
onderzoek. Esther en Marjolein, veel dank voor jullie hulp als student-assistent. Ik 
hoop dat jullie geen blijvende weerzin tegen ‘als-dan-beredeneringen’ hebben. 
 
Mijn paranimfen en goede vriendinnen, Iris en Simone. Wat ben ik blij dat jullie naast mij 
staan. 
 
Iris, tijdens mijn zoektocht als beginnende promovenda kwam jij op mijn pad. Hoe 
toepasselijk dat jij, met jouw Griekse achtergrond, mijn promotietraject richting gaf, 
zoals de Griekse filosofen vormgaven aan het onderwerp van mijn proefschrift: 
kritisch denken. Bedankt voor al je wijze advies, het delen van onze vele 
vertwijfelingen (stelling 6 zal ook jou wel bekoren, denk ik), alle plezierige tijd die 
we samen hebben doorgebracht en je vriendschap. Zonder jou was het nooit zo 
leuk geweest. 
 
Simone, een toevallige ontmoeting tijdens onze allereerste les in statistiek precies 
10 jaar geleden en nu staan we hier. In al die jaren is onze vriendschap alleen maar 
sterker geworden. Bedankt voor jouw puurheid, het vertrouwen dat je me geeft en 
de vele dierbare herinneringen. Laten we samen nog jaren om dezelfde grappen 
blijven lachen. ‘Baie dankie’ dat je er altijd voor me bent. 
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Op persoonlijk vlak is er een aantal mensen dat me tijdens het schrijven van dit 
proefschrift heeft bijgestaan. Zij gaven mij het kostbare gevoel dat mijn leven uit veel 
meer bestond dan werk. 
 
Denise, Janneke, Nadine, Samira en Thari, bedankt voor jullie begrip als ik even 
wat minder tijd had en de onvoorwaardelijke vriendschap. Debby en Diede, onze 
altijd gezellige etentjes, picknicks en andere uitstapjes gaven me de broodnodige 
ontspanning. Annelies, Eline en Mariska, de een nog langer in mijn leven dan de 
ander, ik ben blij dat wij elkaar altijd zullen treffen. Teamgenoten, bedankt voor de 
ontspanning tijdens de wedstrijden en de gezelligheid na afloop. 
 
Een speciaal woord van dank aan mijn gehele (schoon)familie voor hun rotsvaste 
steun en toeverlaat. Bedankt voor jullie interesse in mijn proefschrift en de vele 
mooie momenten samen. Opa en oma, wat bijzonder dat ik jullie mijn proefschrift 
kan overhandigen. Tim, met jouw ondernemende en creatieve geest weet je me 
vaak te inspireren en ben je op vele facetten van mijn promotietraject van invloed 
geweest. Dankbaar ben ik dat jij, zoals het een oudere broer betaamt, altijd voor 
mij klaar staat. 
 
Mijn ouders, Roland en Marianne, ik kan jullie niet genoeg bedanken voor jullie 
onvoorwaardelijke steun en liefde. Van kinds af aan hebben jullie me gestimuleerd 
om het beste uit mezelf te halen en mijn hart te volgen. Jullie hebben de basis 
gelegd en dat ik dit met jullie kan delen, geeft glans aan het geheel. Bedankt dat 
jullie er altijd voor mij zijn. 
 
Tenslotte Nick, bedankt voor alle steun en vrijheid die je me gegeven hebt. Met 
jouw positieve levensinstelling, relativeringsvermogen, gevoel voor humor en 
liefde, lever jij een onmisbare bijdrage aan mijn leven. Ik ben blij dat jij er bent. 
 
 
Lara, juli 2020  
Alles blijft 
Alles gaat voorbij 
Alles blijft voorbijgaan 
— Jules Deelder 
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